CIA UAP 003 THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND OVERHEAD RECONNAISSANCE THE U 2 AND OXCART PROGRAMS 1954 1974

~===~===~~:::::::::~ fri{) _i \ : ..... . /.,. ,. THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND -:.,:-. OVERHEAD (7 ; R ECONNA ISSANCE The U-2 and OX C.\RT Programs, 1954 - 1974 Gregory 'vV. Pedlow and Donald E. vVelzenbach t);J; :~•;/-;:~: _:; .\~:·· ..:__.. :>~~::.< :;;~..:.,· ! ..,: •~ •.... .. ·::/ ' ' .,. !:·-~~-.~..;' - ::::..:· ·r:~.;.,- -:_;~::-:...~ f ; ":· .:..:.... :: • t> ·+·,'(/\,-_;',,:,.. :•-: ... . •:· ! ••• ·.i: •• · : ·: -~ .;'~: :\·· ~. • / · ·, ~ '. .• .· [ },<~-~.~:_.:~ :· : . . .~- ::· .~_:•;··.::?;.\ ..- ~:.-: · ·· · :}·.··.\ :· -:.: ,•.·-:· · ''{ :·: ·- ·.. . ..• > .. ..~ Secret l<JOFOFU'il The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance: The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-197 4 Secret ~ec, et MOFORf~ The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance: The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974 Gregory W . Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach History Staff Central Intelligence Agency Washington, D .C. 1992 Sec,et ♦ et MOFORf~ The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance: The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974 Gregory W . Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach History Staff Central Intelligence Agency Washington, D .C. 1992 Sec,et ♦ Chapter 1 Searching for a System The Need for High-Altitude Reconnaissance ............................................ 1 Early Postwar Aerial Reconnaissance ................................................... 2 New Approaches to Photoreconnaissance........................................... 4 The Air Force Search for a New Reconnaissance Aircraft............... 8 Lockheed CL-282 Supporters and the CIA. ........................................ 13 Scientists and Overhead Reconnaissance ............................................... 17 The BEACON HILL Report .................................................................... 17 Concern About the Danger of a Soviet Surprise Attack ................ 19 The Air Force Intelligence Systems Panel......................................... 21 British Overflight of Kapustin Yar ....................................................... 23 The Intelligence Systems Pane! and the CL-282 .............................. 24 The Technological Capabilities Panel ................................................. 26 Project Three Support for the Lockheed CL-282 .............................. 27 A Meeting With the President ............................................................. 32 CIA and Air Force Agreement on the CL-282 .................................. 33 ♦ Chapter 2 Developing the U-2 The Establishment of the U-2 Project..................................................... 39 Funding Arrangements for Project AQUATONE .................................... 43 Major Design Features of the U-2 ........................................................... 45 The Development of the Camera System .............................................. 48 Preparations for Testing the U-2 ............................................................. 56 Security for the U-2 Project...................................................................... 59 The CIA - .... 43 Major Design Features of the U-2 ........................................................... 45 The Development of the Camera System .............................................. 48 Preparations for Testing the U-2 ............................................................. 56 Security for the U-2 Project...................................................................... 59 The CIA - Air Force Partnership .............................................................. 60 Technical Challenges to High-Altitude Flight ......................................... 61 Delivery of the First U-2 ........................................................................... 66 Initial Testing of the U-2 ........................................................................... 68 U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK................................................ 72 Sec, el NOFORN Hiring U-2 Pilots ........ _ ................................................................................. 73 Pilot Training ............................................................................................... 75 Final Tests of the U-2 ................................................................................ 76 Three Fatal Crashes in 1956 ..................................................................... 79 Coordination of Collection Requirements ............................................... 80 Preparations To Handle the Product of U-2 Missions ......................... 82 The Impact of the Air Force Project GENETRIX Balloons................... 84 AQUATONE Briefings for Selected Members of Congress ................. 88 The U-2 Cover Story .................................................................................. 89 ♦ Chapter 3 U-2 Operations in the Soviet Bloc and Middle East, 1956-1958 The Deployment of Detachment A to Lakenheath ............................... 94 The Move to Wiesbaden ........................................................................... 95 President Eisenhower's Attitude Toward Overflights............................ 96 First Overflights of Eastern Europe ....................................................... 100 First U-2 Flights Over the Soviet Union ............................................... 104 Soviet Protest Note .................................................................................. 109 The End of the Bomber Gap................................. : ................................ 111 T Overflights............................ 96 First Overflights of Eastern Europe ....................................................... 100 First U-2 Flights Over the Soviet Union ............................................... 104 Soviet Protest Note .................................................................................. 109 The End of the Bomber Gap................................. : ................................ 111 Tactical Intelligence From U-2s During the Suez Crisis .................... 112 Renewed Overflights of the Soviet Union ........................................... 122 Radar-Deceptive "Dirty Birds" ................................................................ 128 The New Detachment C .......................................................................... 133 Detachment B Flights From Pakistan .................................................... 135 The Decline of Detachment A ................................................................ 139 Cooperation With Norway ....................................................................... 142 Declining Overflight Activity.................................................................... 143 Concerns About Soviet Countermeasures Against the U-2 .............. 147 More Powerful Engines for the U-2 ...................................................... 149 Intervention in Lebanon, 1958 ................................................................ 152 British Participation in the U-2 Project ................................................. 153 The U-2 Project at the Beginning of 1959 ........................................... 157 ♦ Chapter 4 The Final Overflights of the Soviet Union, 1959-1960 The U-2 and the "Missile-Gap" Debate................................................ 159 The Last Overflight: Operation GRAND SLAM .................................... 170 The Aftermath of the U-2 Downing ...................................................... 177 The Withdrawal of the Overseas Detachments ................................... 181 The Fate of Francis Gary Powers .......................................................... 183 Changes in Overflight Procedures After May 1960 ............................ 187 Geeret PJOFORN ..'t', Chapter 5 U-2 Operations After M ay 1960 U-2 Operations 181 The Fate of Francis Gary Powers .......................................................... 183 Changes in Overflight Procedures After May 1960 ............................ 187 Geeret PJOFORN ..'t', Chapter 5 U-2 Operations After M ay 1960 U-2 Operations in Latin Ameri ca ................ ...................... ................... .. 197 U-2 Support to t he Bay of Pigs Invasion.. ..... ............ .............. ....... 197 Aerial Refueling Capability for the U-2 ........................... ........ ....... .. 198 U-2 Coverage Duri ng the Cuban Missile Crisis .............................. 199 U-2s Over South America ............. ..................................................... 211 U-2 Operations in Asia ........ ........................... ......................................... 211 Detachment C and the Indonesian Revolt of 1958 ............... .... ..... 211 China Offshore Islands Dispute of 1958 ................................ ..... ..... 215 U-2 Support for DDP Operations in Tibet....................................... 216 U-2Cs for Detachment C....................... .................... ... ....................... 217 U-2 Crash in Thailand ......................................................................... 219 End of Detachment C Operations ...................................... ............... 219 Detachment G Missions Over Laos and North Vietnam .............. 221 New Detachment on Taiwan ......... ......... ........................................... 222 Use of Detachment H Aircraft by US Pilots ............................ ....... 230 U-2s in India ................. ........................................................................ 231 Increasing Responsibilities. Inadequate Resources in Asia ........... 233 Advanced ECM Equipment for Detachment H................................ 237 Infrared Scanner Over PRC Nuclear Plants ....................... 238 .............................. ......... 240 =-=-=~ ~~::-::;--::,-;-~~:F:::.:-:=--::-r-;~ quate Resources in Asia ........... 233 Advanced ECM Equipment for Detachment H................................ 237 Infrared Scanner Over PRC Nuclear Plants ....................... 238 .............................. ......... 240 =-=-=~ ~~::-::;--::,-;-~~:F:::.:-:=--::-r-;~ The End of U-2 Overflights o ain an China ............................. 242 Peripheral M issions by Detachment H ................... .......................... 244 Operation SCOPE SHIELD Over North Vietnam ............................. 246 Improvements in U-2 Technology .........................................................247 Modification of U-2s for Aircraft Carrier Deployment ... ... ............. 247 Use of Car rier-Based U-2 To Film a French Nuclear Test Site... 249 A New Version of the U-2 ...................................................... ........... 251 Replacement of the Orig inal U-2s W ith U-2Rs............. ........ .......... 253 The Final Years of the U-2 ................. ................................................ .... 253 Support to Ot her Agencies .... .......... .................................................. 254 Overseas Deployment Exercises and Missions ............................... 255 The Phaseout of the Office of Special Activities ........ ................... 257 0 ) Chapter 6 The U-2·s Intended Successor: Project OXCART, 1956-1968 The Evaluation of Designs for a Successor to the U-2 .... ................ 260 Competition Between Lockheed and Convair ...................................... 267 The Selection of the Lockheed Design .............. ... ................ ................ 270 Efforts To Red uce t he A·12's Radar Cross Section ............................ 274 The OXCART Contract ............................................................................. 277 See, et NOFOAN New Technologies Necessitated By O The Selection of the Lockheed Design .............. ... ................ ................ 270 Efforts To Red uce t he A·12's Radar Cross Section ............................ 274 The OXCART Contract ............................................................................. 277 See, et NOFOAN New Technologies Necessitated By OXCART's Hig h Speed ............. 279 Designing the OXCART's Cameras ........................................ ....... .. ... .... 281 Choosing Pilots for OXCART .................................................................. 283 Selection of a Testing Site fo r t he OXCART.............................. ......... 283 Delivery of t he First OXCART ............................................ .................... 286 Changes in the Project Management .................................................... 286 OXCART' s First Flights.............. ... .............................. .... ..... .......... .. ......... 288 Speed-Related Problems .... .. ........................................ ........... .... ............. 290 New Versions of the OXCART ............................ ............ ..... .................. 291 The Question of Surfacing a Version of the OXCART ...................... 292 Additional Problems During Final Testing ............................................ 295 Discussions on the OXCART's Future Employment ........................... 297 First A-12 Deployment: Operat ion BLACK SHIELD ............................. 304 The End of the OXCART Program ........................................................ 307 Possible Successors to the OXCART..................................................... 312 Summary of t he OXCART Program ...................................................... 313 ♦ Chapter 7 Conclusion U-2 Overflights of the Soviet Union ..................................................... 315 Participation of Allies in t he U-2 Prog ram........................................... 319 U-2s as Collectors of Tactical Intelligence .................... ....................... 319 Advances in Technology............................................... ........................... 320 Cooperation With the Air Force ............................................................. 321 Impact Participation of Allies in t he U-2 Prog ram........................................... 319 U-2s as Collectors of Tactical Intelligence .................... ....................... 319 Advances in Technology............................................... ........................... 320 Cooperation With the Air Force ............................................................. 321 Impact of the Overhead Reconnaissance Program o n the CIA. ....... 321 ♦ Appendix A: Acronyms ............................................................................. 325 ♦ Appendix B: Key Personnel ..................................................................... 327 ♦ Appendix C: Electronic Devices Carried by the U-2 ........................... 335 ♦ Appendix D: U-2 Overflights of the Soviet Union, ............................. 337 4 July 1954-1 May 1960 ♦ Appendix E: Unmanned Reconnaissance Projects .................... .......... 339 ♦ Bibliography ................................................................................................ 347 ♦ Index ............................................................................................................ 355 Warning Notice Intelligence Sources or Methods Involved (WNINTEL) National Security Information Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions Dissemination Control Abbreviations NOFORN (NF) NOCONTRACT (NC) Not releasable to foreign nationals Not releasable to contractors or contractor/ consultants Caution-proprietary information involved Dissemination and extraction of information controlled by originator This information has been authorized for re­ lease to... WNINTEL-lntelligence sources and meth­ ods involved Classified by~~~~ Declassify: OADR Derived from multiple sources PROPIN (PR) ORCON (OC) REL.. WN All material on this page is Unclassified. ieeret NOFGftN FOREWORD This History Staff Monograph offers a comprehensive and authorita­ tive history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program. which from ) ORCON (OC) REL.. WN All material on this page is Unclassified. ieeret NOFGftN FOREWORD This History Staff Monograph offers a comprehensive and authorita­ tive history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program. which from 1954 to 1974 developed and operated two extraordinary aircraft, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It describes not only the program's technological and bureaucratic aspects, but also its politi­ cal and international context. The manned reconnaissance program, along with other overhead systems that emerged from it, changed the CIA's work and structure i.n ways that were both revolutionary and permanent. The formation of the Directorate of Science and Technology in the I 960s, principally to develop and direct reconnais­ sance programs, is the most obvious legacy of the events recounted in this study. The authors tell an enigrossing story. The struggle between the CIA and the US Air Force to control the U-2 and A-12 OXCART projects reveals how the manned reconnaissance program confronted problems that still beset successor programs today. The U-2 was an enormous technological suc:cess: its first flight over the USSR in July 1956 made it immediately the most important source of intelligence on the Soviet Union. Using it against the Soviet target it was designed for nevertheless produced a persistent tension between its program · managers and the President. The program managers, eager for cover­ age, repeatedly urged the President to authorize frequent missions over the Soviet Union. President Eisenhower, from the outset doubt­ ful of the for nevertheless produced a persistent tension between its program · managers and the President. The program managers, eager for cover­ age, repeatedly urged the President to authorize frequent missions over the Soviet Union. President Eisenhower, from the outset doubt­ ful of the prudence and prt0priety of invading Soviet airspace, only reluctantly allowed any overflights at all. After the Soviets shot down Francis Gary Powers' U-2 on I May 1960, President Eisenhower forbade any further U-2 flights over the USSR. Since the Agency must always assess a covert operation's potential payoff against the diplomatic or military cost if it fails, this account of the U-2's em­ ployment over the Soviet Union offers insights that go beyond overhead reconnaissance programs. Indeed, this study should be useful for a variety of purposes. It is the only history of this program based upon both full access to CIA records and extensive classified interviews of its participants. The authors have found records that were nearly irretrievably lost and have interviewed participants whose personal recollections gave in­ formation available nowhere else. Although the story of the manned -Sac,et See1et N0F0RN reconnaissance program offers no tidy model for imitation, it does reveal how resourceful managers coped with unprecedented techno­ logical challenges and their implications for intelligence and national pol icy. For this reason, the program's history provides profitable reading for intelligence professionals and policymakers today. Many people made import.1nt contributions to the production of this volume. ln the History Staff's logical challenges and their implications for intelligence and national pol icy. For this reason, the program's history provides profitable reading for intelligence professionals and policymakers today. Many people made import.1nt contributions to the production of this volume. ln the History Staff's preparation of the manuscript, Gerald Haines did the final revision, Diane Marvin again demon­ [ provided strated her high talent as a copy editor, and[ staunch secretarial support throughout. As usual, we are indebted to more members than we can name from the Publications, Design. and Cartography Centers in the Office of Current Production and Analytic Support, whose lively interest in the publication went far beyond the call of duty. Their exceptional professional skill and the masterly work of the Printing and Photography Group combined to create this handsome volume. Donald E. Welzenbach, who began this study, and Gregory W. Pedlow, w_llo completed it, brought complementary strengths to _this work. A ~eteran of C[A service since 1960, Mr. Welzenbach began research on this study in 1983, when he joined the DCI History Staff on a rotational assignment from the Directorate of Science and Technology. After tireless documentary research and extensive inter­ viewing. he finished a draft manuscript of the history before returning to his directorate. In early 1986, Gregory W. Pedlow, a new member of the DC( History Staff, was assigned to complete the study. A Johns Hopkins University Ph.D. who has served as an Army intelligence officer and University of Nebraska professor of his directorate. In early 1986, Gregory W. Pedlow, a new member of the DC( History Staff, was assigned to complete the study. A Johns Hopkins University Ph.D. who has served as an Army intelligence officer and University of Nebraska professor of history, Dr. Pedlow undertook important research in several new areas, and reorganized. edited, and revised the entire manuscript before leaving CIA to be­ come NATO Historian in late 1989. The final work, which has greatly benefited from both authors' contributions, is the CIA's own history of the world's first great overhead reconnaissance program. ♦ April 1992 J. Kenneth McDonald Chief, CIA History Staff Secret l\10FeAN PREFACE When the Central Intelligence Agency came into existence in 1947, no one foresaw that, in less than a decade, it would undertake a major program of overhead reconnaissance, whose principal purpose would be to fly over the Soviet Union. Traditionally, the military services had been responsible for overhead reconnaissance, and flights deep into unfriendly territory only took place during wartime. By the early I 950s, howe v,er, the United States had an urgent and growing need for strategic :intelligence on the Soviet Union and its satellite states. At great risk, US Air Force and Navy aircraft had been conducting peripheral reconnaissance and shallow-penetration overflights, but these missions were paying a high price in lives lost and increased international tension. Furthermore. many ellite states. At great risk, US Air Force and Navy aircraft had been conducting peripheral reconnaissance and shallow-penetration overflights, but these missions were paying a high price in lives lost and increased international tension. Furthermore. many important areas of the Soviet Union lay beyond the range of existing reconnais­ sance aircraft. The Air Force had therefore begun to develop a high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft that would be able to conduct deep-penetration reconnaissance missions over the Soviet Union. President Dwight D. Eisenhower and his civilian scientific advisers feared that the loss of such an aircraft deep in Soviet territory could lead to war and therefore authorized the development of new non­ military aircraft, first the U-2 and later the A-12 OXCART, to be manned by civilians and operated only under cover and in the greatest secrecy. Primary responsibility for this new reconnaissance program was assigned to the Central Intelligence Agency, but the Air Force provided vital support. The Agency's manned overhead reconnaissance program lasted 20 years. It began with President Eisenhower's authorization of the U-2 project in late 1954 and ended with the transfer of the remaining Agency U-2s to the Air Force in 1974. During this period the CIA developed a successor to the U-2, the A- 12 OXCART, but this ad­ vanced aircraft saw little operational use and the program was canceled in 1968 after the Air Force deployed a fleet of CIA developed a successor to the U-2, the A- 12 OXCART, but this ad­ vanced aircraft saw little operational use and the program was canceled in 1968 after the Air Force deployed a fleet of similar air­ craft, a military variant of the A-12 called the SR-71. Neither of these aircraft remai ns secret today. A great deal of in­ formation about the U-2 and its overflight program became known to the public after I May 1960, when the Soviet Union shot down a CIA U-2 and publicly tried its pilot. Francis Gary Powers. Four years See,et later, at press conferences in February and July 1. 964, President Lyndon B. Johnson revealed the existence of the OXCART-type of aircraft, although only in its military YF- l 2A (interceptor) and SR-7 l (strategic reconnaissance) versions. The two CIA reconnaissance aircraft have also been the subject of a number of books, beginning with David Wise's and Thomas B. Ross's The U-2 Affair in 1962 and then Francis Gary Powers' memoirs, Operation Overflight, in 1970. Two recent books give many more details about the U-2 and OXCART air,craft: Michael Beschloss's Mayday: Eisenhower, Khrushchev and the U-2 Affair (l 986) and William Burrows's Deep Black: Space Espionage and National Security ( 1987). Although well written and generally ac­ curate, these books suffer from their authors' lack of access the U-2 Affair (l 986) and William Burrows's Deep Black: Space Espionage and National Security ( 1987). Although well written and generally ac­ curate, these books suffer from their authors' lack of access to classified official documentation. By drawing upon the considerable amount of fonnerly classified data on the U-2 now available to the public, Beschloss has provided an accurate and insightful depiction of the U-2 program in the context of the Eisenhower 21dministration 's overall foreign policy, but his book does contain errors and omissions on some aspects of the U-2 program. Burrows's broader work suffers more from the lack of classified documentation. particularly in the OXCART/SR-71 section, which concentrates on the Air Force air­ craft because little information about the Agency's aircraft has been officially declassified and released. After the present study of the Agency's overhead reconnaissance projects was completed, a new book on the U-2 was p+ublished in the United Kingdom. Chris Pocock's Dragon Lady: The History of the U-2 Spyplane is by far the most accurate unclassified account of the U-2 program. Pocock has been able to compensate for his lack of ac­ cess former participants in the program, especially former pilots. Pocock is also quite familiar with aircraft itself, for he had worked with Jay Miller on the latter's excellent technical study of the U-2: Lockheed U-2 (l 983). to classified documents by interviewing many There has also been a quite familiar with aircraft itself, for he had worked with Jay Miller on the latter's excellent technical study of the U-2: Lockheed U-2 (l 983). to classified documents by interviewing many There has also been a classified official study of the U-2 and OXCART programs. In 1969 the Directorate of Science and Technology published a History of the Office of Speci,al Activities by SeeFet Helen Hill Kleyla and Robert D. O'Hern. This 16-volume Top Secret Codeword study of the Agency's reconnaissance aircraft provides a wealth of technical and operational information on the two projects but does not attempt to place them in their historical context. Without examining the international situation and bureaucratic pressures af­ fecting the president and other key policymakers, however, it is impossible to understand the decisions that began, carried out, and