CIA UAP 019 Australian Dept of Defense Scientific and Intel Aspects of the UFO Problem

Approved for Release 2026 Under Section 1842 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 4,dth the recommerdiitiunis nf the Condon report, Project BLUE BOOK vas terI11inated, but presumably this veu]d ha.vo little effect on the main progr1-;1,n,me. It would a.ppenr wrong for Au:stralia to remain ignorant ci' 5. the true situa'ticr::.. We l&ck an intelligence viewpoint th11.t ca.n &seess the nature and poasiblo consequences of the problem, ~ scientific vie~~oint that co~ld derive :!ICicntifically valid data from the reports &nd a public relations viewpoint that ca~ honestly satisfy public intere:!lt. To overcome these deficiencies in the Australian iuvestigaliun of UF0 1 s, it would :5eem that a strong ce.s,:i exists for the acceptance. of the RAAF suggest.ion that another government department assume responsibility for the investigation and analysis o.r UFO report.!. National Archives of Au,straHa NAA: A 13693, 3092/2/00Q U.S. OPFICIAL ATTITUDE TO U.P.D•:s In June of 19,17 the Air Techni~ o.l Int('lligcncc Centre (ATIC) near Dayton, Ohio, assumed a. re·,pcnsibili ty to investiga.te the ioi tio.l 1 ::.:ports of 'flying saucers'. Vi tldn Air Techni~ o.l Int('lligcncc Centre (ATIC) near Dayton, Ohio, assumed a. re·,pcnsibili ty to investiga.te the ioi tio.l 1 ::.:ports of 'flying saucers'. Vi tldn a month ii, 1ou cons:iderc~I tho:!. tlui plHWDllH!llct. Wt!.tl~ I"F!tLl o.nd !H·obably of Soviet origin. Ey the end of' the y .. a.r 1 when ATIC was offie ial ly author iso-i to invntiga.to under the project code no.n.c of SIGN and with a. high priority,most nf the investigators lrl'er:: focus:dng on an inter­ planetary ra~her tha11 a. Soviet origin. TJJese opi n:i ans were cry:stalliz:;-d into 11 "'ri tten csti:nate that .,,·as sent to the Pentagon in September 1948. Vnen the inte rplo.nc to.ry cone lusions were re ,:j ~c .od on th<J groumls of instifficiant ha.rd evidence, a reaction :set in a.t ATIC e.gl!l.insti trying to unravel the liFO problem. 2. In Febru~ry 1949, ATIC personnol ur. Project SIG~ were replaced Witt> nev personnel 1-0 form Project tHtUJJGE. A defini·te attempt vas mado during !.9·19 to use Project GRUDGE to destroy any acccpt ol ur. Project SIG~ were replaced Witt> nev personnel 1-0 form Project tHtUJJGE. A defini·te attempt vas mado during !.9·19 to use Project GRUDGE to destroy any acccptani::o of UPO'!!!. The motives for this ;ue not t:lear: po:s:o.ih!y Air Pore,~ embarnLssmE!.n t at being incap.,.ble of controlling tha situation <tnd/ :•r a fear of national p{l.nic prompted L"SAF to try and remove the problem by denying its existence. Another possible motive mo.y have been to provide a breathing spncc ror nno Urnr "inve:stigati ve agency '1 to 1·each some cone lusion; the agency had been asehting A.TIC through 1948 and, con1.rary to official USAF policy, vas maintaining a bich level of interest during 1949. This govcrn~ental agency '-'IHI not th,~ FBI, e.nd had rcckl!'t, nuclca.· and inti!llig,~ncP. experts; their pur1,o,;;e was to study OFO n:port,s in an effort to HlltllE!l' de:,ign data Oil int-erplanetury space sh ip!'I. development~, thiR agency wus almost certainly the CIA. In lhe light of l.a ter 3. Project GRUDGE failed to eliminate the UFO problem, U1" ' de:,ign data Oil int-erplanetury space sh ip!'I. development~, thiR agency wus almost certainly the CIA. In lhe light of l.a ter 3. Project GRUDGE failed to eliminate the UFO problem, U1"0 reports in 1949 actmdly exceeded the numbr!r in 1918, and several people who had gained ,1.ccess to earlier offici,d repor!.s wPre ublli to contnuJic l Lhe USAF. Journalists gonero.lly !el t that GRCDGE :reporting represented e. cover to a more serious kno•.!cdgc. Eventually, USAF intelligence dE>c ided. thi'.t a fresh approo.ch to the JJr1,bl em "'HS ne-ccs~ary. Between Se1,t.r1m·:Jr:r 1951 unu I.he establ:i.shnent of Pro,i(•Ct BLUE BOOK in March 1952, UFO investigation rugn.incd ndcquo.tc finrinC'inl and o.dministra:tive :JUpport to once a.gain aaa.ly:se the col lee teu uc.ta, Projttct BLUE IlOOK was a.ble tu process !Jiu data frci::n 3,200 report,E int.o a form suitable for their consul tan Ls to bl' :!.blc to use IBM card- National Archives of Australia NAA: A 13693, 3092/2/000 • sorting machines. 2 • The su111me r { i f 1952 sa"' & more thaa Ls to bl' :!.blc to use IBM card- National Archives of Australia NAA: A 13693, 3092/2/000 • sorting machines. 2 • The su111me r { i f 1952 sa"' & more thaa twenty-fold rise in ~- the normal r1,1.te of reporhng and inclu~ed I-he eigbtings invdviog lia.shington D.C. This marked increase in !'!ightin~:s bad diverae efl'ect:,. A cu•npunent. of USAF intcl..1..igence considertJd th1.t UPO 's W&l'e intcrpl1\11eia!"y spo.cClships \lhich vore about to make closer ec,utnct, To prepare the public for this po:isibili ty 1 41 previously cl~ssified reports vere re}Pasei for publication bet~eeo. AugtJ.st 19~ 2 rnd February 1953. These reports contradicted the two cxtensi ve Jul!· ear lie?' offic io.1 USAF policy of di511li5siog the reporb as mi5- identification:, etc. On the other hand, the CIA regarded tho su~mPr UFO activity as a throat to national security mainly because the resulting crowdeo communications and defence forcee involvement lessened. the lfvel of national a.lertmi:ss r:,gains t possible en!'my P.ttaclt. 5. .\ 3C ienti!'ic p:.ncl chaired 'Dy H.P. crowdeo communications and defence forcee involvement lessened. the lfvel of national a.lertmi:ss r:,gains t possible en!'my P.ttaclt. 5. .\ 3C ienti!'ic p:.ncl chaired 'Dy H.P. Robert:son was '::onvened b1• the Office of Scientific 1nte11 igence c!' CU. during mid-January 1953 tor the purpose of recot1m11nding future o.ction on the UFO proble11. Briefings vcr<; n,a.dc both by CIA a.nd USAF. ATJr:: per:,onnel sho•ti11 t:1e then c l:i.asified two rnovi e films of UPO 's and the early results of statistical analysis of J,200 reports. Because of the vital issues invol Vl'Jd, re:: t ric ted to recon::mend i ne that the th~ pane I f'e J t investigetion be contimrnd, but 'Wi Lh increased personnel and equipn:ent. 'l'he USAF responded proa1ptly '>li th a.n ins true tion to comply vi tb these recommondntiona. Th~ CIJ. 1 ho-ever, in a report dated 16 February 1953 aho'o,c,d 6. a preference to publicly abandon the investigo.tion whil:!it intensifying the collection Clf data. Hy September 1953 Lhe CIA position had been la.rgdy achieved with Project BLUE BOOK rcducad from A staff of ten qualified po:r abandon the investigo.tion whil:!it intensifying the collection Clf data. Hy September 1953 Lhe CIA position had been la.rgdy achieved with Project BLUE BOOK rcducad from A staff of ten qualified po:rsonnel operating at a top secret level to a virtually inactive project involving one airman. The invc5tigating ~omponPnl had bel'n tre.nsferred to the 4602nd Air 111 lc.,.ligli'nce Se:rvic e Squadron vhieh was trained in rapid intelligence procurement and reported to Air Defence Command and USAF Intellizence '\ia!';hi.ngt.on rel.her than Bl,IJE DOOK. Direct accus s be tween the 4602nd AISS and ::.11 USAF uni t.s vas atnhorized by AFH 200-2 whcrens previously this privilege had boon gi ve-n to BLUE BOOK. Al thnugh on1y Llw v.irracrn (first-class) - remained in Sept.e111ber 1943, BLUE BOOK was later built up to one officer, one sergeant, one secret-ary, and a pa:rL-t.ime·c:-00!:!ultc:1.nt : National Archives of Australia __:______________________;,_____ NAA: A 13693, 3092/2/000 _. 3. f Dr J. All(m Hyrwk, staying at about this level until it was closed dovn in December 1969. During Lhis t.inw BLUE BOO){ served mo.inly as e. moo.ns _. 3. f Dr J. All(m Hyrwk, staying at about this level until it was closed dovn in December 1969. During Lhis t.inw BLUE BOO){ served mo.inly as e. moo.ns of supplying unclo.ss ified su111maries of UFO identifice:Li<mB to the public, a.nd did not form a vitn1 link in collection or Berious analysis. Control of public awareness of the UFO situati.:in vas 7. tightened by the issuing of JAKAP 146 in 1953 which prohibited service personnel from di.,cussing UFO's by threatening defaulLerc; with up to 10 years gaol and up to a $10,000 fine. When service personnel resigned or re tired, howe..-er, 1 t wa.s po:iisible to reTeal US.AF attitude~ o- opinions even if 11.ctual jR.ta was still rec1 t.dc Le(1 Ia. this way many Intelligence .Dffi::crs associ-o.tcd·-_wi th the UFO problem, including Major D. Fournet who was BI.CF. BOOK Project Officer at the Pentagon until l~te 1952, Captatn E. Ruppolt who headed Project GRUDGE and Prt,ject BLUE .BOOK until September 1')53 and Admiral Hillenkoetter who directed CIA from it, inception until October 1950, on retiring froffi tho services, all publicly s~ated that the GRUDGE and Prt,ject BLUE .BOOK until September 1')53 and Admiral Hillenkoetter who directed CIA from it, inception until October 1950, on retiring froffi tho services, all publicly s~ated that the U.S. Gover:iment knc., UF0 1 s were extra-torrestial but vu.s ..,.ithholding this fact fro!D the public. , When the National Investigation Committee on Aerial Phenom~na 8. (NICAP} was fornllHi in 1955 to counter the publicly suppre3sed USAF invostigation of UFO's, the firet Cha.irman was Admiral D.S. Fahrney who h~d directed the Navy's guided missile programme from its inception. Apft,rt, from Admiral Hillenl~oettt>r, Major Keyboe and Major Fo11rne-t, other Directors have incluilod Rear Admi!"al H.B. Kno1,les, General A. Wedemeyer and t:ol J,J. Brye.a (who was .:i. special assistant to the Ser.retl'l.ry of the Air Foree). To reduce the effect of these &nd similar defections from o!ficia.l policy after rd,irernP.ni., revised JANAP 146E, passed in 1960, made it an offence under the Eepionage Act if data on UFO's were revealed, the 9. The change in style of USAF reporting before and after the Robertson penel meeting is clearly in 1960, made it an offence under the Eepionage Act if data on UFO's were revealed, the 9. The change in style of USAF reporting before and after the Robertson penel meeting is clearly indicated in the Project BLUE BOOK Special Report No. 14, The body of the rl'port. prep<'-rell hetve.en March 11)52 and early l95J, i:dthough bicsod in favour of a natural expll:.na-Licn for UE'O' s, ne"",:irl.'rui l ciss shm,ed mathematically that the evidence favoured an explanation that was scientifically unknown, This sect.ion of the 116 page report was not released to the public other then aa ~ copy to ho consulted, assuming the readnr kn~w uf National Archives of Australia NAA: A:1 3693, 3092/2/000 4. 4 its existe-nce. Public disl.rihut.ion vaa !ll~de, ho,.-ev{lr, of a so­ ee.lled 11 summa.ry" 1-hich in fa.ct did not Sul"lmariso, nor scarcely &lludo to the 19·17-52 dc.ta 1 but conccntra.tcd or. 1953-55 rcportin.; which vas cle~rly designed to reduce the residual unknowns to nn insi{:nificant number, no matter how senseless tho identification became. 10. Vi t.hin U1u body of the dif fi cul t 55 rcportin.; which vas cle~rly designed to reduce the residual unknowns to nn insi{:nificant number, no matter how senseless tho identification became. 10. Vi t.hin U1u body of the dif fi cul t.-to-oh ta.in .re po'r l thei-e il!I an intores~ing diagram. The product of the estimated obr.erv"r relia.bil i ty and t.be rel)ort reliability be,ame the sighting relinllility. Tht! ,percenlng!! of reporls that had to be register"'J t•unkno1.1n 11 (i.e. incapsble of being .,ye,. approximately identif i ,.-d a.s aa a. known object) increased as the sighting reliability impi.·o·:ed. Conver5eJy, the percentage listed as "insufficient info~naLion" d"creased with improving reliability. ~ighting Relia.bili ty No. of Reports Uoknovn (%) Insufficie111, Informs.ti en (,t;) Poor Doubtful Good Excellent 435 794 757 213 16.6 13.0 24.8 33.3 21.4 14.0 J.6 '1.2 Throughout the years of the UFO phc,nomenon, there has been 11. e. persistent for:n of official pronouncements ',/hich state thut th-, percentage of unknnwn5 would bA redu~ed if more data were c~ailnble. The tshove table contradicts that statement. Reports of excellent persistent for:n of official pronouncements ',/hich state thut th-, percentage of unknnwn5 would bA redu~ed if more data were c~ailnble. The tshove table contradicts that statement. Reports of excellent reliability g1merally s tom from a.strono:nerE:, pilots, scientists, surveyorn 1 mctcorolo;:ists, radar operators etc, complete with instrumented valueR and Rccund,ely cllit.fdlt~d uc:counts. The introduction o~ good raliablo reporting pr•vnnts the roady prosaic In all probability the overall average percentr.g!J int.eq>ri~tation, of llnkno..,ns ( 19. T~) would h :~.ve be ,m subs len I, ia l ly increased if thE.' dita hnd been more reliablo. 12, Project BLUE BOOK ccmsul tants sta.ti s t:i cal ly tos ted the unknovn object popula~ion to determine the likelihood tbat it wn3 similar to the popult\tion of identified objects and found tha.t the probability was less than one in 1028 (i,e. using the American ~ational Archives of Australia NAA A 13693, 3092/2/000 4. 4 its existe-nce. Public disl.rihut.ion vaa !ll~de, ho,.-ev{lr, of a so­ ee.lled 11 summa.ry" 1-hich in fa.ct did not Sul"lmariso, nor scarcely &lludo to the Public disl.rihut.ion vaa !ll~de, ho,.-ev{lr, of a so­ ee.lled 11 summa.ry" 1-hich in fa.ct did not Sul"lmariso, nor scarcely &lludo to the 19·17-52 dc.ta 1 but conccntra.tcd or. 1953-55 rcportin.; which vas cle~rly designed to reduce the residual unknowns to nn insi{:nificant number, no matter how senseless tho identification became. 10. Vi t.hin U1u body of the dif fi cul t.-to-oh ta.in .re po'r l thei-e il!I an intores~ing diagram. The product of the estimated obr.erv"r relia.bil i ty and t.be rel)ort reliability be,ame the sighting relinllility. Tht! ,percenlng!! of reporls that had to be register"'J t•unkno1.1n 11 (i.e. incapsble of being .,ye,. approximately identif i ,.-d a.s aa a. known object) increased as the sighting reliability impi.·o·:ed. Conver5eJy, the percentage listed as "insufficient info~naLion" d"creased with improving reliability. ~ighting Relia.bili ty No. of Reports Uoknovn (%) Insufficie111, Informs.ti en (,t;) Poor Doubtful Good Excellent 435 794 757 213 16.6 13.0 24.8 33.3 21.4 14.0 J.6 '1.2 Throughout Uoknovn (%) Insufficie111, Informs.ti en (,t;) Poor Doubtful Good Excellent 435 794 757 213 16.6 13.0 24.8 33.3 21.4 14.0 J.6 '1.2 Throughout the years of the UFO phc,nomenon, there has been 11. e. persistent for:n of official pronouncements ',/hich state thut th-, percentage of unknnwn5 would bA redu~ed if more data were c~ailnble. The tshove table contradicts that statement. Reports of excellent reliability g1merally s tom from a.strono:nerE:, pilots, scientists, surveyorn 1 mctcorolo;:ists, radar operators etc, complete with instrumented valueR and Rccund,ely cllit.fdlt~d uc:counts. The introduction o~ good raliablo reporting pr•vnnts the roady prosaic In all probability the overall average percentr.g!J int.eq>ri~tation, of llnkno..,ns ( 19. T~) would h :~.ve be ,m subs len I, ia l ly increased if thE.' dita hnd been more reliablo. 12, Project BLUE BOOK ccmsul tants sta.ti s t:i cal ly tos ted the unknovn object popula~ion to determine the likelihood tbat it wn3 similar to the popult\tion of identified objects and found tha.t the probability was less than one in 1028 (i,e. using the American ~ational Archives of Australia popula~ion to determine the likelihood tbat it wn3 similar to the popult\tion of identified objects and found tha.t the probability was less than one in 1028 (i,e. using the American ~ational Archives of Australia NAA A 13693, 3092/2/000 5. 4f system, the odds were ten thousand trillion trillion to one ago.in:5t the unk,rni.n:5 being the same as the known:s). Since the consultants !'tad arbitrarily called al 1 gni~n firoball!5 a.ml short dura. tion (i.e. less than f i vc seconds) n.1.ght-timc si.ghtings ns known nstronornicltl 0l1j11r. t.R !,here was tin undue preponderance in tba.t cntogo1'y. Hence, as1rnming that 11'> ·'1'3trononlical objocts were left in the unknni.ns, the :stati:stical tests ..-ere repented vi th astronomical i,lentifice.tions removed. Tne odds were reduced to i.-~ tri l lior. ~ril lien to one-. The ena.lysts could not find a way to reduce th.:?se odds sufficiently further to warrant additional tel!!ting, and i rra.tionally considered. the results to ba "inconc lu~ ive 11 • lJ. While PROJECT BLUE DOOK cndao.Tourcd to reduce the official number of uukr_o.:ns - in 195 !!ting, and i rra.tionally considered. the results to ba "inconc lu~ ive 11 • lJ. While PROJECT BLUE DOOK cndao.Tourcd to reduce the official number of uukr_o.:ns - in 1957 they claimed. ouly 14 out of l tQQ(i sightings remained unidentified - the covert programme expanded considcra.bly. 'l'he govcrnn:ent agency ( al-no:it certainly CIA) tha.~ had been collecting da.ta on l:F(' per!orma:ice a.nd propulsion methods durini; 1948-52 presu:nably inf' luenced U.S. goYernmen tal funding of certain 'lava.need projec·l:i. One project was the Canadian Avro sau;:-er. A dra.win1 oft.his saucer 1eleo.scd ill Gctober 1955. showed a typical in many UFO reports. The Secretary of t¾I! flying disc a!" dt~<;t~ r i !:rnd Air Force, D,J,., Q~.,arles, appeared moderately confident that such a vehicle '1ould be s1:cce!'l:!irul1y develop!:!tl oy the U.S. 14. A more utounding deci:don en the part of the U.S. Government was ·1,o allocate considerable:- funds to investigate gravity and a. ■ eans nf controiling g:ravity. Despite the fact that science b.::.d not attained a Jqvel of competence to d~al with either gravity Government was ·1,o allocate considerable:- funds to investigate gravity and a. ■ eans nf controiling g:ravity. Despite the fact that science b.::.d not attained a Jqvel of competence to d~al with either gravity or the only tt1oory tha.t mJ.ght be ui>:tilicuhle anti-gravity probler.1s aJld W&! Einstein's Unified Field Theory 'l\'hich was still incomplete e.t the time of his death, tbn U.S. chose to support gix universitios and government agencies in an all-out drive to conquer the proble~. TL is significant t.hat at this Lime thll' cu.-rent Urnories on UFO pro:puhlon were a ndxture of gra:v.i ty con.trol and eleat:ro...ma.gn,etic propul.lio.n .. Dli.r:lng J.. 955 1 beee,use :insuttie:i,t1.1:1t, $1:,aft C()U.J!,d. be recrtlli,i,•)•cl. 15. for the project, recourse waa made to an urgent appeal for theoretical phy,.i:-,:d.. s1,$ e,ni:l. Gravit:,, Rasea1•,ch C,entres btiinlil adabl islu?d Yere at thll: Institute for A4vanced s:t.udy (P.1~:i..n.,111e1:,on., H,,J,), Prim:et,01:1 U111.. i .. nr'sity, Un.1.v,:rsU:y fr~11ll. A:~~ Yere at thll: Institute for A4vanced s:t.udy (P.1~:i..n.,111e1:,on., H,,J,), Prim:et,01:1 U111.. i .. nr'sity, Un.1.v,:rsU:y fr~11ll. A:~~1:u; Ha,rwell, U.K. Thtl Si.I. !1Ht1:,ha111.111,t,ie i,MUI. ,;I 11 ..,,tiJatio,~,all Archives o•f Australia NAA: A13693 1 3~92/2t0q1Q 6. ~ of Indiana, Purdue Univenity Rel!learch Pounda.tion, University of Norlh Ca.ru) ina and the Mlls.sachutH! Gt.s Ins Ii '..u Le 01' echnology 't through the (Roger Bn.hson) Gravity Ras">a.rch Institute (New Bost1n H.H.). The latter institute is a non-rr~fi't. organization found·.:d in 1949 vith Geo:cge M. Ridecnit &s Pre!'.l~dcnt. Jt 1<as believed that to make a gravity motor, a gravity dj ffcrentie.l lla.s required 'o'hi ch ncccssitntcd the discovery of an ili:ml&.t,or, deflector or absorber of gravity. By 1955, 485 esl!lays had hcen written on this subject and awards totalling Sl0,800 mad0 for c~iginal contributions. The l!lcienti.st.s invu1ved i.nclwfod Teller from Univereity 16. of Calif 485 esl!lays had hcen written on this subject and awards totalling Sl0,800 mad0 for c~iginal contributions. The l!lcienti.st.s invu1ved i.nclwfod Teller from Univereity 16. of Califox•nia, C'ppenheim1;1r and F.J. Dyson cf tha Institute of .ldvanced Studies, J.A. Vheeler -an~ ,&j chord 'Ai'+fow:tt·t of Princeton, Va.cle.y- Hlavaty r,f University of Indiana {who hP_d !ourked with Einstein in Prague) and Stanley Duser. Tho objective l1a.s to control gravity. During 1955 the followiug firms entered into gravity &nd/or electromagnetic programme5: Glenn L. M11-rtin Av"i at.ion Co. (specifically Dr B. Heirn from Goettingen University and Dr P. Jordan from Ha.n:iiurg University), Convair of San Die 6 o, Bell Aircraft of Buffalo, Sikorsky Divi5ion, Lear Inc. o:r Sant.a Moidca., Clarke. Electronics of :Palm Springs, California, a.nil. Sperry Gyroscope Division of Great Neck, Long Island, N.Y. Such a.n intensive onslaught on the gravity enigma was 17. entirely irrational from the standpoint of conventional science, and can only be rationalized within the context of a firm belief tbat UFO' s \l'erl' real and thE.t the in tell il!7tmces behintl . entirely irrational from the standpoint of conventional science, and can only be rationalized within the context of a firm belief tbat UFO' s \l'erl' real and thE.t the in tell il!7tmces behintl thew. know how to control gravity. The drivu to b~rnesE this power before the USSlt could do !O 1.-ould be a .strong incentive for the U.S. GoTernment to fully support an anti-grn.v.ity programme. By 1966, 46 sapa.ra.te projects of this nature were being financially supported, 33 of which wcro under tho ~upcrvision of the U.S. Air Poree. Al though details of most of these projects havA: been kP-pt. c·l HSS if.ii~d it would appear that generally they have not been successful. Work on gravitationn.l vuvcs by J. Vcbcr and his associates under USA~ Ca.mbrid.ge ReseA.rch L11.bora.tory ju1·.isdic l,lan hal:! he1:1n reported. fairly extensively since 1966, 18. Dudng August of 1965 Project ELl,;E BOOK rocci vcd 262 reports which was about six times the a.veraee number for a month a.nd 'Was twice any pr1:.•vl.ous rnon th s i nee November 1957. On National Archives of Australia NAA: A 13693, 3092/2/000 7. 28 times the a.veraee number for a month a.nd 'Was twice any pr1:.•vl.ous rnon th s i nee November 1957. On National Archives of Australia NAA: A 13693, 3092/2/000 7. 28 S4-pte1nber 1965 Pfaj, Gen. Ll'Bailly, Dintctor of Information, formally requested tho Air Force Scientific Advisory Board to review Project i3Lm: BOOK. The review aug::;eated tha.t the lirni tc>i! Project BLUE BO JK staff 11.nd the official inves ti,ga ting of ricer~ did not possess the tcchnicul competence Lo properly identify lne phenomena and that university tea.ms should be appoi.nted to invl'stigo.te selec tcd sightings. This cone lusion wn.s supported b:• the Rouse Armed Servic1~s Commit.tee which met on April 5Lh 1966 in the shndo.._ or a pub lie furore consequent to the USAF idf. nti ::'), ng the ,rn 11-public ised Michigan sightings as b1d.ng si.amp gas. The Colarado University 1,ns s1?lecte-d for the task and Dr Ed.re.rd U. Ccndon appointed to le,~d the project with o.n in .. tia.l allocation of $Jl) ,OOC later raised to $525,000. ' . The reve&l ing of a memorandum The Colorado project became di!!Cr•}di tad when to le,~d the project with o.n in .. tia.l allocation of $Jl) ,OOC later raised to $525,000. ' . The reve&l ing of a memorandum The Colorado project became di!!Cr•}di tad when Dr Condon 19. atr..ted publicly un 25th Janu.:i.ry 1967 that "my a.ttitude rigt..t Go,.. ie thot there's nothing to it, but I'm not supposed to reath a conclusion for another ycar 1 outlining a method to trick the public, ~ombined with & grnoral dis!la.ti:,fact:;.on ~t Conrlon' s biassed ai.ti tude J and re:,ignation of mo•t of the staff &ftrr most of the investigations had been made but no L compll!tcly written up. The fioal report o.f' 9(:} poges lacked coherence, Condon's conclusions Wl'rc ~t variance with individual staff conclusions, although only Condon's conclusions were J>Ub lie ised. Aa a result of the Condon re port, USAF c losi!d do,.n Project BLCE BOOK shortly before the .\merican Association for the Adv1rncerucn i, of' Sc iea1.:o held a special mc(iting 1,o counter-act th~ effect of the Condon report. The Chairman of the Special (;orumittuP 1 Dr Thornton Pa.gl?, was ono of tbe signatories ' Sc iea1.:o held a special mc(iting 1,o counter-act th~ effect of the Condon report. The Chairman of the Special (;orumittuP 1 Dr Thornton Pa.gl?, was ono of tbe signatories to the Rob£rtson r(~por t. led to the dismissal Dr J. Allen Hynl?k, l!cientitic consultant to Project Blue 20. Book 1948-69 1 bogo.n his association with n convicticm that 11.ll sightings could be conv~ntionally explainud, Even though doubts grew in his mind, he found hjmself obliged to support offjcial USAF public policy. Since 1966, ho-.;ever, he has become more outspol,en against the l;SAF attitude and has as.! i!!lcd ·to convcme both congressional hearings and scientific syr:1.pos in on the subj cc t. AHhough ini Li 1ll ly :mp port i.ng the Condon Comrai ttee he became di£illusiancd and critical of it with thP pnssng~ of time. It is quite clear that Dr Hynek along with many o thcr reputable sc i(!ntis ts do not accept the USAP explrmation of misidentifies t.ion, hyst.cr in or National ~r~ives of Australia NAA: A13693, 3092/2/00_0 9. # it is unl:ikely tlmt. UFO report!! will receive any treatment beyond filing. 4 identifies t.ion, hyst.cr in or National ~r~ives of Australia NAA: A13693, 3092/2/00_0 9. # it is unl:ikely tlmt. UFO report!! will receive any treatment beyond filing. 4. follo1'.'.i.1ie the public USAF a.ttitudo, it would hf' prPferablc to If Au:<. t,r,11ia is to follov the U. S, lead,._ instead or follow 1-hc USAF/C:::.A. role of cnncentratins ori gP..ining a kno1oledge of the po\.'er !!ourccs involved. Howcvo-r, it may be preferable to &ct inc.lependent1y of the U.S. a.nd initia.te a programne that is scientifically sound and intollectually honest towards unravelling the UFO 111y:r>tcry. Ill such 11. venture, it ma.y be worthwhile 'tforking ao11c-..,ha-L c:1o:.;er t.o the public than i.s usual in the U.S. and U.K. I National Archives of Australia NAA: A13693, 3092/2/0Q0 APPENIHX '',\" Event 2-1.6.47 6.47 Arnold sighting 0f nine "3auccr&" creutcs public inL~rr~•. lnvestignlions initiated by Air Techuicnl Intelligcncb Centre (AlJ~) of Air ~aterial romcand (A~C, Arm:• Air Forces)