NASA UAP D016 Preliminary Gemini 4 Crew Debriefing Part1 1965

I f I 82 3 8 42, /0 0 / /4- CLASSIF!CAT:ON CHANGE o____ By authority of--~4,...L.11.1-...___.~~L--L-....t.-e=---1 hanged by U~1:i:.~1 LDate 1973 PRELIMINARY GT- 4 FLIGHT CREW DEBRIEFING TRANSCRIPI' PART I Prepared By Spacecraft Operat ions Branch Flight Crew Support Division June 16 , 1965 This material contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws , Title 18 . U. S . C Section 793 and 794 , the transmission or revel a ­ tion of which in any manner to an unaut horized person is prohi bi ted by law . Group 4: Downgr ade at 3 year intervals Declassified after 12 years NOTICE: This document may be exempt from public disclosure under the Freedom of lnfor• rnation Act (5 U.S.C. 552). Requests for Its ra• lec1~e to persons outside the U. S. Government should be handled under the provisions of NASA Polley Cir-ecti11e 1382.2, COI\JFIDENTIAt PREFACE This preliminary transcript was made from voice tape recordings of the GT-4 flight crew debriefing conducted aboard the recovery ship, the USS Wasp , on June 9, 1965 . Although all the material contained in this transcript has been edited, the urgent need for recordings of the GT-4 flight crew debriefing conducted aboard the recovery ship, the USS Wasp , on June 9, 1965 . Although all the material contained in this transcript has been edited, the urgent need for the preliminary transcript by mission analysis personnel precluded a thorough editorial review prior to its publication. Errors in this transcript will be corrected as soon as possible and an official transcript will be published at a later date. This document contains a transcript of the first part of the debriefing, during which the crew described the mission generally from an operational viewpoint . A preliminary transcript of the re­ mainder of the debriefing will be published by June 23, 1965. It will cover systems operations, operational checks, visual sightings, experiments , pre-mission planning, mission control, and training. Paragraph Page Number TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. 0 2. 0 COUNTDOWN 1 . 1 Crew Insertion . ... ................... . . . 1. 2 Cornmlll1ications . . . . . ............... .. ... . ..............-..6 1 . 3 Crew Participation and Countdown .... . 7 1.4 Comfor t . ....................... . 1. 5 Environmental Control System .................... ' ..... . ,9 1. 6 Sounds ...... . 1 . 7 Vibrations .. . 1. 8 Visual .. . ....... .. . 1.9 Crew Station Controls and Displays .... 11 . ... 13 . ... 13 .1 5 .. . 1 .. .. 2 • • • 6 Sounds ...... . 1 . 7 Vibrations .. . 1. 8 Visual .. . ....... .. . 1.9 Crew Station Controls and Displays .... 11 . ... 13 . ... 13 .1 5 .. . 1 .. .. 2 • • • • M ....................... 17 ........................ POWERED FLIGHT 2 . 1 Lift- Off Cues 2. 2 Roll Program 2. 3 Pitch Program ... . 2. 4 Aerodynamics .... . 2. 5 Environmental Control System 2. 6 Maximum g ....... . 2. 7 Windshear ...... . . 2. 8 DCS Update 2. 9 Engine 1 Operation ..... 2. 10 Engine 2 Status .. . 2.11 Accel eration g's .. . 2. 12 BECO ........ . ...... . 2. 13 Staging . . . ...... . 2. 14 Engine 2 Ignition 2. 15 RGS Initiate .... . 2. 16 GO/NO GO . ............. . 2.17 Systems Status ........ . 2 . 18 Acceleration ................... . 2.19 SECO. ....... . 2. 20 Steering ....................................... . ..... 19 20 . .... "" ............... 20 ....... 21 . ...... 21 22 . 22 .23 . ........ 23 . ........ 24 .. .................... 25 . .. 25 ... 26 . .. 28 . ..... 28 . .. .. 31 . .... 31 . .. .... 32 ... .... ...... .... ' .... ...................... • M . • • • • • • • 3.0 INSERTION 3.1 Post- S.EDO •... 34 ................ .. 35 3.2 SECO + . .... 31 . .. .... 32 ... .... ...... .... ' .... ...................... • M . • • • • • • • 3.0 INSERTION 3.1 Post- S.EDO •... 34 ................ .. 35 3.2 SECO + 20 Seconds 3.3 Insertion Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 ORBITAL FLIGHT 4. 1 Station- Keeping ....... .... .. ......... . 4.2 Extravehicular Activities ............ . .......... ... 50 . ......... - .. 87 5 .0 6. 0 1.0 Ot her Orbital Opera tions Preretro Preparations ... . ........ ..... ~86 ..... 250 REI'ROFIRE 5.1 5. 2 5. 3 5.4 5. 5 5. 6 5. 7 5 . 8 5. 9 T - 36 Events ... . ~ - 22 Events .. . :5:i- 13 Events :5:i- 12 Event s ... . !R- 5 Events .. . ........ . ~R: 1 ~eennttss • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • iir.: 0 .c, v Ret r opack Jettison ........... . Communicat i ons ... . ........... . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • REENTRY 6. 1 Reentr y Parameter Update 6. 2 400 K .................. . 6. 3 0. 4 g ................ . 6.4 Accelera tion Profile 6. 5 6. 6 6. 7 6. 8 • • • • • REENTRY 6. 1 Reentr y Parameter Update 6. 2 400 K .................. . 6. 3 0. 4 g ................ . 6.4 Accelera tion Profile 6. 5 6. 6 6. 7 6. 8 Main Chute Deployment . . 6. 9 CommUJ1ications . . . . . . . . . 6.1 0 Singl e- Point Rel ease .... 6. 11 Pos t main Checkli st Items Spacec raft Contr ol ........ . 100 000 Feet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 000 Feet ............. . . ....... . . . . . .. . . ............ 259 . ... 260 ... 260 .. 26 1 . ... 265 .... 270 .... 273 . ... 280 .••• 281 .•••• 282 . .... 282 . . .. 284 ..... 290 .... 296 ...... 296 .. •.. 299 . ...... 302 . .... 303 . ........... . .... 305 ......... ·• ....... 306 LANDI NG AND REDOVERY Impact ...... . 7.1 7. 2 Checklists 7. 3 Communi ca tions ... Systems Configuration 7.4 Spacecraft Sta tus ...... . .... . 7. 5 7.6 Post- Landing Activiti es ..... . 7. 7 C·omfort ............... . Recovery For ce Personnel 7. 8 7.9 Egress ......... . .. . Survival Gea r ..... . 7. 10 7. 11 Crew Pi ckup ......... . ... 310 .. 313 ... 314 ..................... 316 . ............ 320 . ............... 325 . .. . .. .... ... 325 .. 326 . . ......... . .. . Survival Gea r ..... . 7. 10 7. 11 Crew Pi ckup ......... . ... 310 .. 313 ... 314 ..................... 316 . ............ 320 . ............... 325 . .. . .. .... ... 325 .. 326 . . 327 ...• 328 . ....... 328 CO ►~FIDE►~TIAb. 1.1 Crew Insertion 1.0 COUNTDOWN White The only problem during insertion was that I fogged up again in my suit before we got the fans on. I think I'm just going to always fog up in that suit of mine. We turned the fans on quick, but with the visors closed it doesn't go out. McDivitt We did have a problem with crew insertion on the Wet Mock and I think we had that probably pretty well taken care of. They put us on the suit loops and didn't turn the fans on. Normally you wait for a clearance from the 1:t>acecraft Test Conductor before you throw any switches. Well, after we almost "died" of carbon dioxide poison­ ing during this +,est~ we got this matter clarified. As soon as we got in the spacecraft and one of us was on the suit loop, we would go ahead and cut the switches on to put us on two fans. We did this during insertion in the Wet Mock. It really went well. White We really went for a long was on the suit loop, we would go ahead and cut the switches on to put us on two fans. We did this during insertion in the Wet Mock. It really went well. White We really went for a long time in Wet Mock. I was beginning to wonder if I was going to have to open my visor. COt74 FIDEt~TIAsb- I was really uncomfortable. 2 McDivitt But everything worked out okay on this one . White Yes. McDivitt The timing was excellent , I thought . I didn't think we had any prob l em at all . White No. I don ' t believe they missed a stroke on the insertion. 1 . 2 Communications White I think the communications were pretty well worked out, Jim? McDivitt Right . One thing, the last three minutes or four minutes, we got a little confused about who was talking to who . I was getting the Spacecraft Test CJnductor , the Booster Test CJnductor and the CAP COM at the same time . White We got a split count , too, on lif't--off. McDivitt The f irst three or four minutes I was hearing the B)os ter Tast C?nductor . I heard what was going on on his loop , and I was listening to him get checks in f r om all of the guys . I really wasn ' t getting a clue a s to what was going on C?nductor . I heard what was going on on his loop , and I was listening to him get checks in f r om all of the guys . I really wasn ' t getting a clue a s to what was going on . I was supposed to be getting the booster clues from the test conductor . I was supposed to find out when the engines were going to gimbal and when they -€9 ·NFl9E~TIA;t COl>J~IDENIIA~ 3 were going to open the prevalves and stuff. I wasn't getting it from him . We were getting a lot of other information that made a lot of sense to the Booster Test C :>nductor, but not an awful lot to us . There were cal l - outs l ikeVSequence 05003 complete." Well, thi s just didn' t mean any­ thing to us . On top of this we had the Spacecraft ~es t Conductor calling out the times , and super­ imposed on all of this was Al Shephard , the Cape CAP COM , calling out events that he was reading off that went on at certain specified times . He called out','Stage 1 prevalves Vand we could hear the fue l gushing downstairs and the whole booster rumbling. He called out ','Stage 2 prevalves','and you could hear the same thing all over again. I thought t hat was a lot more meaningful than the test the fue l gushing downstairs and the whole booster rumbling. He called out ','Stage 2 prevalves','and you could hear the same thing all over again. I thought t hat was a lot more meaningful than the test conductor comments. White I think that was wrong, the way they were doing it . I think we weren't supposed to be on any loop except CAP COM at that time . McDivitt Well, I think what happened was that we got this thing over-coordinated. Al was going to give us all this information, but then as a result of GT-3, (Gus and Jolm said they didn ' t get enough -t:ON FI0 Er\JTl~L 4 r<3 eI<i FltEt>I TIRt information about the boosters) they put this in­ formation on the test conductor ' s loop too . We ha.d too many guys talking . I think if just CAP COM talked from thr ee minutes on down we would be all right . White This is the way I thought it was going to happen, and then from three minutes on down it really got busy with the yak , yak, yak of everybody talking . McDivitt I don't lmow whether we got off the Booster ~st C)nductor's loop or not, but at final countdown , Al gave me 2 minutes , 1 1/2, 1, 30 , 20 , 10 , don't lmow whether we got off the Booster ~st C)nductor's loop or not, but at final countdown , Al gave me 2 minutes , 1 1/2, 1, 30 , 20 , 10 , 9 , 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2 , 1 . I got a similar count from the Spacecraft Test C~nductor but it turned 01 ·.t that they were a second out of sequence on the countdown and Al was giving me 10 and our Spacecraft Test Conductor was giving me 9. So it went ten- nine , nine - eight, eight - seven . They were at the same t ime . All I knew was that we were getting close to engine ignition and then it started . So , we got a little over-communicated there . I think t hey kept us adequately informed on the hold . As a matter of fact , I ' d say we got over- informed there at the end . We had too many guys keeping us informed and I t hink the pendulum <Ol<:JFIDel'4TIAl 5 swung from the GT-3 flight where nobody got in­ formed of anything over to our flight where we got i nformed by three different people about the same event . White On our flight, too, we were really more aware of t he problem than those people were. We could sit anything over to our flight where we got i nformed by three different people about the same event . White On our flight, too, we were really more aware of t he problem than those people were. We could sit right here and see the gantry come down and stop, that was r eally the only problem they had in the whole count . McDivitt I don't think radio discipline is a problem, Each guy was disciplined on his own channel . They were conducting their tests on their own channel . But we were lis tening to three different communica­ tors at the same time. We should have had only one . I think probably what we will need to do is to get to about T-3, and then just cut in the CAP COM. White That was the way it wa.s planned to be, I thought . That's the way Al planned it. McDivitt That's correct. I think, because there had been some lack of information on GT-3, that it some­ how had been written into the SEDR so that we were also on the Booster Test Conductor 's MOPS, so that we were also getting his countdown. COrq--pf0f:Nfl1tt I 6 think CAP COM, 'alone, would have been sufficient . One further comment , I had to turn my ·11HF volume all the way up to hear anybody getting his countdown. COrq--pf0f:Nfl1tt I 6 think CAP COM, 'alone, would have been sufficient . One further comment , I had to turn my ·11HF volume all the way up to hear anybody . I was at max . There we were sitting right on the pad , talking to a gu:y two miles away, and there I was with the volume full up . It didn ' t give me much confi ­ dence as to reception I was going to get when I was 200 miles away , or three or four or five hundred miles away . I thought that the volume control on the radio was inadequate. White We were wondering what we were going to have when we got up a hundred miles . McDi vitt That's right. At max volume we didn't have enough and at minimum volume it didn't shut it off. We will cover this later. 1.3 Crew Participation and Countdown McDivitt I think it was just about right . I don' t think we were over worked and I think we had enough to do to keep us busy. White Actually, all we really made was a check of switches . There wasn ' t really too much else . Having the back-up crew run that midcount was the the right solution. I wouldn't have wanted to participate in anymore of t he countdown than I -COt<JFtDEt'4 wasn ' t really too much else . Having the back-up crew run that midcount was the the right solution. I wouldn't have wanted to participate in anymore of t he countdown than I -COt<JFtDEt'4flJ<l €O ► 4FIDE ► ~TI/>,~ 7 did. McDivitt That's an excellent point. The flight crew's participation should be the final count, not the midcount and precount. It doesn't tire the prime crew out doing a lot of chores that they don't really have to do. I think this is a good pro­ cedure. 1.4 Comfor t White Initially, the first 20 or 30 minutes, I was squirming around and I felt a little uncomfor­ table. But after I had been in for 30 or 40 minutes I didn't feel there was a real restric­ tion on staying for several more hours. I would have been very disappointed if they had said, "Well you have been in there long enough and we will work on this gantry and try it again tomor­ row." I would have been happy to stay there several more hours while they fixed the gantry instead of pulling me out. After an hour and 40 minutes,which is the end of the normal countdown,I didn't feel uncomfortable. We sat in the simulator and were a lot more un­ comfortable than this try instead of pulling me out. After an hour and 40 minutes,which is the end of the normal countdown,I didn't feel uncomfortable. We sat in the simulator and were a lot more un­ comfortable than this. I didn't feel uncomfor­ table. I had a chance to take a couple of little CO ► 4FIDE~~TIA~ 8 COl'IFIDE~4TIAt naps . I noticed Jim was napping too . McDivitt Yes . I concur with F.d, although I don't want to get carried overboard. We shouldn't scrub due to crew fatigue . White I think it is up to the crew. If the crew is un­ comfortable they should come down. But I don't think he should say, "Okay, two hours and 30 minutes . You cut this off. ", because it is an operational procedure. McDivitt When I first got assigned to the crew I always fe l t one of the toughest things to do would be laying back for an hour and 40 minutes or so prior to launch . The time we spent in the simu­ lator laying on our back, I thought to be a very uncomfortable position. As we went through all the training and testing at McDonald , and again at the Cape , ;ny back got more callouses on it. I got used to laying with my feet over my head . very uncomfortable position. As we went through all the training and testing at McDonald , and again at the Cape , ;ny back got more callouses on it. I got used to laying with my feet over my head . At launch time I wasn't a bit tired from laying on my back . White This is brought out in one of our last simulations , where we ran the whole four hour simulation and we forgot to have them tilt us up to 30 degrees. We just got used to running that way, COl"I P"te E~~Tl,\l €Otr4F IDEttftAl 9 McDivi tt That ' s right, I just don't think we should scrub the flight because of fatigue.I don ' t think we should do that. We weren ' t approaching this point. White We had a long way to go. 1 . 5 Environmental Control System McDivitt I think we ought to get this water management panel squared away and everybody figure out what we are supposed to do with those switches. I don ' t think we should be arguing about where the switches are supposed to be on the launch pad. If I hadn't asked somebody where the waste manage­ ment switches should be we would have probably launched with it in · EVAPORATOR. I knew that i t wasn't supposed to be in the evaporator . At one of the ten thousand briefings the waste manage­ ment switches should be we would have probably launched with it in · EVAPORATOR. I knew that i t wasn't supposed to be in the evaporator . At one of the ten thousand briefings we got on it, we were told it shouldn't be there . We ought to get· this kind of stuff squared away before launch day. Thirty minutes before lift-off we were arguing about where that switch was supposed to be. White I wasn't confident that they knew where they wanted that switch to be. McDivitt Well, I didn ' t think we should have it in the eva­ porator. So, I think that water panel could have cost as much as a wee~s slip on our launch because coNFIDENTIAt- 10 €01'1FIE>Et<ITtAt they didn't know where to put those valves and it's only got three valves on it . It ought to be made much simpli er than it is . I think they should get that squared away before the next flight. F,d and I knew where we wanted it. We wanted it off and the other two switches in NORMAL and leave it alone . That's what we flew with . That's the way it ough t to be fixed . White We can get canned , though, for not flying with it in the right position by the checklist . It didn't say that on 's what we flew with . That's the way it ough t to be fixed . White We can get canned , though, for not flying with it in the right position by the checklist . It didn't say that on the checklist Every check list we got was different . McDivitt That ' s right! Fach one was different . Fi nally we decided we were going to do it as w.e did and left it thr ough out the whol e flight . Evel;'y­ thing worked fine . We had ECS briefings by a mul titude of peoples from MAC including the guys who designed it. Everyone of them dis­ agreed , It probably started out to be one of the simplest things in the whole spacecraft . By the time they got t hrough confus ing us with it, I got the feeling nobody knew what was s_i,,.pposed to happen to it . I consider this the most danger­ ous of all. '€ 0 l<I F' IE> Et-q ftAt 11 White I was convinced of that, too, after the mix-up in putting all the water in the lithium hydroxide tan.ks. McDivitt There would have been about a 30 minute four-day mission. McDivitt The people that built the thing don't know how it is supposed to go . They had better decide this and let us know. I felt that George Roe at the Cape 30 minute four-day mission. McDivitt The people that built the thing don't know how it is supposed to go . They had better decide this and let us know. I felt that George Roe at the Cape knew what was going on except the Cape personnel got the valves in the wrong position and almost lost the lithium hydroxide canister full of water with no water in the tanks. I ' m not pointing a finger at George Roe • I think he' ·s pret.ty knowledgeable about the system.. Maybe somebody just wasn't following directions. But somebody ought to find out about the water management system and make it clear to everybody how it is supposed to be operated. 1.6 Sounds McDivitt You can hear the prevalve~ both first and second s tages. The prevalves and the fluid gushing are very loud noises comparable to the engine gim-- baling. I wasn't really aware that they were ~ going to be that loud. C-0t~FIDf~qflAb 12 'COI\IFIDE~◄ llAl White I got that feeling when I read Gus and John ' s debriefing . McDivitt Did you? I didn't . I got the impression that it was going to be a much quieter noise . White Well, the whole noise level of the engine girnbal­ ing was louder than I thought it was going to be. It 't . I got the impression that it was going to be a much quieter noise . White Well, the whole noise level of the engine girnbal­ ing was louder than I thought it was going to be. It surprised me . McDivitt Yes . Engine gimbaling was much louder than I heard before . We heard this during Wet Mock and during precount and at midcount. You can hear those engines gimbal around; they really shake t he spacecraft . But, I really wasn't prepared for the big noise that the prevalves make, and such a long noise as that fuel gushed down to the bottom. I guess that was what it was. I didn't like t he sounds and vibrations we got when they raised and lowered the gantry. White It shook the whole spacecraft . McDivitt It shook the whole spacecraft--did you notice how it never came up straight? The spacecraft was supposed to line up kind of like this and then wham! I had visions of them knocking us off and laying us flat on the ground before we were launched , co~,Fl0Et'4TIAI: cor:,-~FIDEl'~TIA I 13 1 , 7 Vibrations White Those are closely associated with the sounds. McDivitt Yes . I think that the engine gimbaling makes a tremendous vibration in the spacecraft and pre­ valves on opening and make 13 1 , 7 Vibrations White Those are closely associated with the sounds. McDivitt Yes . I think that the engine gimbaling makes a tremendous vibration in the spacecraft and pre­ valves on opening and make a tremendous vibration. The gantry going back and forth vibrated the spacecraft. I don ' t think there is anything else , do you? White No. 1,8 Visual White Well, you can sure see the gantry lower and the whi te room disappear. That is about all you can see besides the sky. McDivitt That's pretty impressive. That's when I sort of got excited,when the gantry went down. That ' s a new realm. White I thought they were going to launch me. McDivitt You're sitting there by yourself then, instead of all those people milling around. I do want to make one other comment on this visual thing . We did Wet Mock about one or two o'clock in the afternoon. The sun was shining right in the window, almost straight down, such that the sun came across my visor from about just at the GOt~FIDEMTIM 14 t:Ol-<IFIDEt'4T IAt bridge of my nose on down . I had a tremendous amount of reflection inside the helmet, and I had a great amount of difficulty seeing the instru-­ ment panel . As a matter of fact, I'm IAt bridge of my nose on down . I had a tremendous amount of reflection inside the helmet, and I had a great amount of difficulty seeing the instru-­ ment panel . As a matter of fact, I'm not sure I could have seen the instrument panel at all . ~ose first few seconds there are extremely cri­ tical on launch. You have to be able to see those tank pressure sages . We ought to keep this in mind for those late afternoon launches . White That is a problem , but the g loads are so small at this time you could a l most forget ab1ut look­ ing up . McDivitt Did I fly like this for awhile during l aunch? White I don't think so but you could have, The g load is so small. McDivitt I'm not sure whether I did or not. White "'his is what we had to do during Wet Mock. We had to put our hand up and cover the window to look down at our instruments to see them , McDivitt I 'm not sure I didn ' t launch that way . White I wouldn't be surprised if you did . McDivitt I don't think I launched that way, but as we tilted over and we got in the sun, I think I put my hand up for awhile . COMftDEl'1 I IAI. 15 White Well, if the don't think I launched that way, but as we tilted over and we got in the sun, I think I put my hand up for awhile . COMftDEl'1 I IAI. 15 White Well, if the g's are so low that-- McDivitt When sun gets in your face you can't see the in­ strument panels because they are just too dark . White The sun gets in your eyes. The point that Jim was making is towards a late-in-the-day launch, which we might have later in the program , there might be a bit of a problem of seeing the instru­ ments during launch. Unless they put something up, which I really don't think you want to d~ You are just going to have to put your arms up and shield the sun out and concent~ate on your in­ struments or you won't see them . They are just gone. There is probably a point even in an early morn­ ing trajectory as you start to pitch over where the sun will come right in your window and you won't be able to see your instruments unless you shield your eyes. 1,9 Crew Station Controls and Display White I found the switches all where they were supposed to be and the cockpit all set up. McDivitt So did I, except the comment I made on the water management system. They didn't have the control White I found the switches all where they were supposed to be and the cockpit all set up. McDivitt So did I, except the comment I made on the water management system. They d