DOW-UAP-D093_Analysis-of-Flying-Object-Incidents-in-the-US_1948

DEClASSIFIED J YSIS OF FLYING 0BJJ£CT INCi IN THE UNITED STATES 203 - - -- - ·~--- ~ ·--= - - - ~ • MEMO ROUTING SLIP 1 NAME OR TITLE NEVE., -E~PROVALS, DISAPPROVALS, -CONCURRENCES, OR SIMILAR ACTIONS INITIALS CIRCULATE ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION DATE COORDINATION 2 3 4 REMARKS FILE INFORMATION NECESSARY ACTION NOTE AND RETURN SEE ME SIGNATURE /4·~6r-F7 r /~ ·~ .~£k._ . w , ·~ ~~~~----,;;,--.....pre,//"'-A. ~ ~- 7.7Y/ .Q~GANJZATIGN AND L8CATION . D D 1 Ff.GERM~,.,. 9__ -_ _ vu 5 ReplacesDAAGOFortn895,1Apr48,andAFRQ Form 12, 10 Nov 47, whibb may be used. --. TELEPHONE 16-48487""' GPO t..trasucm nr1JIS10:1 srurn: OI/USAF-'Ol-0:} •• !ll!¾1S:: or,, rtm•o oa.Bar nicnr~:ij;s n1 THE u.s. , 20) 10 nccembc,r 1948 J:1T.Sr~IµUl'IC l Air r.ntel eq Ulv Air E1tio3~B • ODI A1r Intel DiV land 3 4 2 . 3- . • ' ot fl.TI:na l) ct1da t • mrra 1. To e:P:uune ttom or tnctico or ~Flying SAuc • ODI A1r Intel DiV land 3 4 2 . 3- . • ' ot fl.TI:na l) ct1da t • mrra 1. To e:P:uune ttom or tnctico or ~Flying SAucnr:.U (ht'1'Gimftar roforre;l to oo .tl.ylnJ objeota) and to devolop oonclum,ona aa to thi JX)Cllib1.llty of eximnca. JU,crs A~ DISCUSSIO.i 2 .. . A dotnUed di:ccwmion of inforoatio:l f . )~ on 'the F,Oblc a.c =t forth above 10 otttiched. WJ Ap::, n<li.x rAo. Tho rm.n pointo oottib­ liuhed thereiJ:l nra au=nrl~od bol<m. 3. 'l'ha f'r4qu 07 or reported :tnc1d:mtn, tho oinilarity !i.t mny o! t..~ elmractoti.ctice1 nttrib"i1t«l to -th:, obue:nrcd object nntl tho qunlj.ty - a.r obtiorv rs comdderod ,aa 'O halo, aupport th cont,ntio.11 t~t co t~ or flyiriG objmct ma b:lan obaorwd. A!)!Jroxit!.n.tol_y 210 itwi<Wntlil lmv-s been ,:,.oportod. AnonB the obsorvarc r porting on auch incidantu • nra tr.:iinad and cxp,rienoed u.s. ll'eather nur~u ~ nnel., USAF itwi<Wntlil lmv-s been ,:,.oportod. AnonB the obsorvarc r porting on auch incidantu • nra tr.:iinad and cxp,rienoed u.s. ll'eather nur~u ~ nnel., USAF rated ~accn, •~<.l!lced CiViliOJl piloto, toobnicuuts cumociatea m.th vat""lO>JD resoarch p.rojcsctc and techhid.nn• emplo d by ~o io l nir­ l1ne•• 4• Th• po■s1b1l1ty t • t reported ob nation ot flJ1ng object■ overt e u.s. r~ 1nn,umced by previcma lli(l21t1ne or lOidentut d in nurop , rt1culnrl7 over "caDllinavia :1n 1946, and tl t t. oblervara raoortit'lJl ~ in'.!ldents bavc, int rafted in b- nin 1 _tXlbl.1.eity t.!J.V Cl C • - 1-", t.ho pOS•lb'i 11 ti.ea itlprobabl.e report• CWl II t C from u.5. adl.n • 11 ' strmtion• or t ~ ba.llooo■ tMd "1'Vttr • ai Ud stran lecttd ex- u., .-, o • a: cl ano 11" ,arver 1 11 tt1 1Llilil.sr o ;j ct ~ ne ocoolicm. \'bD laat obi,a~tion at \oidcnt1tiod ol>,,1eot,s w , o • a: cl ano 11" ,arver 1 11 tt1 1Llilil.sr o ;j ct ~ ne ocoolicm. \'bD laat obi,a~tion at \oidcnt1tiod ol>,,1eot,s wao 1n Al)rl.l.. . 194?• 0\ all tour ocoaaiono too tbcJi' Uoon and tl uninantifi-1 objcota wen !rt v1'n thr-<mgb thi tbeodolito. Thoco obotnat.1.ona at. Rio~d nurcau occ~ •w.ntl 1:10ntha before i,.iblloity on tbiJ tl11nc ~aera a peared in • u.s. nG'Jfopap;r. s. Deecrl.ptiQ.'1\1 ot the tly:ln objoote till into thN• CnntiB\ir&... tion cutagorioa, (l) diak-ahapcd {2) rou · cl~b:lpc,d (3) balls ct fJN,. -~lo/,Ul!l conditions ot Y.i.o1b1.Uty and ditfeNUco, 1U angleo at wlloh thtt objecto may havo been v1aw d :lntroducaB a pooo1b111ty, t a o1nl9,a tYJ>l,I objc,o~ f/JAY hDv bOcn ob1orvad rtt.t.lier tl1IJ\ thr d.1.tt:•ront. ~a. Thia ~b i l i ty 11 f"llrtbcr nbatlntiate.d by tho taot that in tM 'Wbo1'W auah ob,3eota bt&fl rtt.t.lier tl1IJ\ thr d.1.tt:•ront. ~a. Thia ~b i l i ty 11 f"llrtbcr nbatlntiate.d by tho taot that in tM 'Wbo1'W auah ob,3eota bt&fl been obeetrvod U- t4nt1o ot tho three em oaor~t1on1 io •P~tol-1 tm 'tm S.dtnt1ttcatlon of that obj a\ ®rlnot bet raadU¥ acccul)llebed on tb bii11 of inl'ormation l'epottod 01:1 oacb incidtnt. tt, 11 po1otbla tha\ obj.ct, or objoot1, 7 betm do!lorltica~ 1&111chad dm.cCNI web wetmr ballo=a, rook.9t.~ Mr ntal n.,,ttl(! ffinC aircratt, or' cele ttal phenanana, It la n•o1N11&.\'7 to obtain tnto aoti"fity to ~firm or deny t.~11 p1>anib1Uty. pendJ.na upon. With whtoh thie 7 ae<impltehld, tora1 dffloeD 1:l\111\ n con- •1d• d Bl a po1n1D111ty. 7. 'lh8 pt.item ot •1ftit1n u detinable, 1 tin haw be t 1n t the ltatea bof'der1n Atlantic clfio at JJ.ne•• 1r1d c.t.ral 1ta • ot Ohio «nd ent\ieij. A loc&Uon of el in ;9 1e at obtd •• A paidUt n t the ltatea bof'der1n Atlantic clfio at JJ.ne•• 1r1d c.t.ral 1ta • ot Ohio «nd ent\ieij. A loc&Uon of el in ;9 1e at obtd •• A paidUt o "• . den • s., not; qo 1.ri&bla. (1) ru reportod flying objecto, particularly those described ae disk~ and rough oi~r _aha~a. (Seo Append1eea "C11 and nn11 . ) Among those which Jiave been operational in recent yeara are the XF5U-l ("Flying Flapjack") developed by Obance-Vaugb:tt, tM Northrup B-35, and the turbo-jet powered . Northrup YB-49• Tb& ~osent exiatence of any privately developed fiying­ wing type aircraft baa not been determined but one ouch aircraft, the . I Aru.p taille$8 monoplane, was operational at south Bend, lndiana, prior to 1935. {2) Objects are fore:i."1, snd it ao, it would aeem most logi­ cal to consider that they are from a Soviet eouree. The Sovieto posoese • l, ' ' " intormtion on a number of Oenian ni,.ng-1iringt1P9 aircraft such aa the G>tha P60A, Junkers EF 1~ long-range, high-speed j~t bomber and the Horten 229 twin-jet fighter, -whioh p-:irticularly reaablea ooe ot the descr1pt1ona of unidentified aircraft such aa the G>tha P60A, Junkers EF 1~ long-range, high-speed j~t bomber and the Horten 229 twin-jet fighter, -whioh p-:irticularly reaablea ooe ot the descr1pt1ona of unidentified flying objects (See Appendix 110 11 ) . As early aa 1924 Tncheran01rt1k7 devoloped a "Parabola" airorart, an all wing de&ilJl, which wno the outcoms of oonm.darabls Soviet experimentation with gliderD or the oame general. form. SOYiet aircraft baf!led on ouch deaigna m.1.ght bave speeds approaching trnnsonio •peeda attributsd to aome flying object ■ or greater overall performance assuming the succ&as.ful developxnent at eome unueual propulaion d~ce aaeh aa atomic energy engine. 9. That tb9 Soviet■ have a current interest 1n flyinc•'Wing type •iroraft 1• auggeated by their utilization of nr. OuS1ther BOolc who, at the end ot world rrar n, • • 1n charge ot the nyJ.ng-wtng progru in Germany' (see Appendix ttA", ~•graph 3, page 4). Aobievementa aat1•­ taotory to tbs u.s.s.R. are indirectly indicated by the pereooal recog­ nition h• 1• report.ed to be NoetTing in the u.s.s.n. Recently it ha11 been repoi-ted tt»t the u.s.s.R. 1 otory to tbs u.s.s.R. are indirectly indicated by the pereooal recog­ nition h• 1• report.ed to be NoetTing in the u.s.s.n. Recently it ha11 been repoi-ted tt»t the u.s.s.R. 1• planning to build a n ..t of 1,800 - Horten flying-Wing aircraft. Informati(m of low evaluation baa baon reoeind etatintr t!nt a regl.lns.nt ot jet m.ght .tishtere, Hod•l Ilorten XIII, 11 at Kumm:f kha, an air base two miles t1outl'Pfea\ of Iiokutak. Kurm;ti kha. is identified as one of a number of airfields for the pro- - tection ot an atomic energy plant at Irkutsk. The Horten XllI as developed by Oermny ,ms o. glider. 10. Assu.idng that the objects might t,ventually be identifiod as forei~ or foreign-sponsored dev-lces, the possible reason for their appe,arance over the u.s. requires consideration. Several posoible ex­ planations appsnr noteworthy,, v.i.zi a. To ne~te u.s. confidence in the a.tom bomb as tho moot advanced ond decisive weapon in warfare . b. To perform photographic reconnaissance missions. c. To test u.s. air defenoeo. d . To conduct :f'ami.liari~ation £lights over u.s. territoey. OONCLUSI<llS u . Since tm .Ur r.-orce is reaponsiblo for control or missions. c. To test u.s. air defenoeo. d . To conduct :f'ami.liari~ation £lights over u.s. territoey. OONCLUSI<llS u . Since tm .Ur r.-orce is reaponsiblo for control or the air in - the dofcnae of the u.s~, it is 1.mperativn that all other agenoies oo-­ opsratc, 1n confirming or denying the poeoibility that theae obje-,ts have a domestic or1:61n• otherwiao, if it is fir.inly indicated t.bat there 1a no d01ne1t10 explanation, tM object• are a throa~ and warrant m.ore activo etforta of identification and intorc~tion. 12. It mua-t be accepted tmt some type of fi1ina obj•ots ha'Ye been obae"11d, although the i r identification and origin are not diaoernabl.e. Di the intereot ot' national defense it would bj un'rfiN to overlook the po~sibility that e e ot tmee objects i:ny bs of toreia;i origin• 4 Inole1 l~ " d1X "A" - Analyaie of Flying Objeot Inoidents in tbl u.s. and Hypoth9t1oal Taotios Employed .Appendix "B• - Plot or Flying Objeo'b S1Sht,1np in the U.S. Appendix II C1' .. Selected Reports of Plying ObJeot Incident• Appl.tldb. ?tD• - FlJing lfinl Type Airoratt APPEiD B• - Plot or Flying Objeo'b S1Sht,1np in the U.S. Appendix II C1' .. Selected Reports of Plying ObJeot Incident• Appl.tldb. ?tD• - FlJing lfinl Type Airoratt APPEiDIX llAlf ANALYSIS OF FLYilTG OBJECT IUCIDENTS Ilf Tlm U.S. AND HTPOTHETIOAL TAOTICS l'?iPLOXED l. Introduction. To formulate tho possible tactic• of jects reported ovor the U.S. assumes from the outGet that firm conclu­ sions have beon reached on both the exiotonce pnd origin of the r oported flying objects. The current status of information on such incidents and overall analys1o doec not cllow subotentiation for auoh concluaione. However. the lack of such firm concluaions points to the necessity for an immodiato and sound statisticnl annl7oiA of every nepect of the aituo.­ tion and doeo not proclude a concurrent examination of the reported in­ cidents to develop explanatione of their possible tactioe. The latter will be useful at oome future date ohould tho exictencea.ndoririn of the flying objocts be definitely e•tabliahed. Theroforc , tho followint; anolyais of availablo information ii advanced in order to praeent evi­ dence on the actunl exhtenoa of somo tn,e fl7ill(; object be definitely e•tabliahed. Theroforc , tho followint; anolyais of availablo information ii advanced in order to praeent evi­ dence on the actunl exhtenoa of somo tn,e fl7ill(; object and to relate samo to tactical purposen for which the objects are pose1bly deeiEned. The foJ.lovin,:; dhcueslo.n mu.at be cone1derod a provi111onal o.nalycie, pend1n6 a further dotailod analyaio of all aspects of the problem. 2. Somn J1.1rpoota RMIU'tllM F171na ObJeot Incld~nt4. A. cureory cxaM1nat1on of evidence on reported incident ■ haa been mnde o.nd it 1• po111ble to cite certain genorAlltiee which it npp~nre MQ.1 be borne out when detailed a.nal71os ha~• been completed. Amo~ the 1noidentB reported there are m&IJ.1' otatemonta by reliable and experienced pereone which t~nd to confirll that fl7lng ob­ j~ote havo been aeon. The detcription of ouch objeot~ 1nem• to fall rou«hl7 into thre• catogor1$ ■: (1) 811••r dieke or balls. &pproxil0at1n& - a Horton will«$ tn>e aircraft; (a) Dal.le Qf fire ot Tnrlous colore and into thre• catogor1$ ■: (1) 811••r dieke or balls. &pproxil0at1n& - a Horton will«$ tn>e aircraft; (a) Dal.le Qf fire ot Tnrlous colore and lntenei\101; (3) Ott r or p noil-shaped object, atmtl~r i~ apponronce \o V-2 type rockets in horliontal flight. ihe numbere of configurations 1 > might be further roduced wi the follow~ conoideratione i n mind: Silver disks or balls have, or the greater part, been observed in daylight nnd a number under lear weather conditions with visibility unlit1i~edt In aost instanc a. balla of fire have been oboerved at night. Oie;ar. or pencil-sh od objects have been aig~tod in fe\fer nwnbers but ~,ith about equa distribution in daylight and at nieht. A few accounts toll of ·eks havil'.l,f; u rough eigar- ahapo whon viewed vh1lo maneuvering. me of the dioka are described no having lw:ninoa1t7 in daylight. hereforo is poseible that e sin&lo type of object J11a1 be involved i cightinga. and diffo~onceo in dee­ cription n1A7 reault from vi ng tho objects at variouo ~lee and under diftoring conditiona vieib1lit1. Tho n.boTo J11a1 be involved i cightinga. and diffo~onceo in dee­ cription n1A7 reault from vi ng tho objects at variouo ~lee and under diftoring conditiona vieib1lit1. Tho n.boTo indicate that some type object h:l.e been oeen and tho poseibil ity t tho object or obJecta aeen aro conven- tional domestic deviceG , ru e.a we&thor balloons, test rockets, or Jet­ equ.ipped aircraft with pane or flyi~ will£ oonfigur~tiona. The nos1ibility e ate that the reportiJ:I& of f~ill8 objects may have rliar reports on similar inoidente in Soondino.via. and OllXltral Ilur The publication in newaq>npera of de­ tails on auch incidents. bo foreign and dom~atic. 1187 hove induced eo~o of the description pro ded in reported domeatic inoidenta. However, one of the enrlieot reporte 1ightiD4t~ in thou.a. wae the one obaencd by U.S. Weather Dureau per1 el in April 1947, at lliobmon,, \irginia. and on \hG baei• ot report lt appears that the diek• are not bulloonn. It vould aeem \ thin aighttng w•• not lnflueno~d by the re- port• of forGt n 1nc1dontm, ot report lt appears that the diek• are not bulloonn. It vould aeem \ thin aighttng w•• not lnflueno~d by the re- port• of forGt n 1nc1dontm, be nev~Bfer aooou.nte of domoetic lnoidente, - nor by mieldentiflcation of conTcntional object. Altho~h reported mestie 1noidonte are l.1id.oly aoetterod through­ out the u.s., fregy.ency of ,;htl:ng a.nd n'U.lllber of obeervors per sighUue; . ' 'asouoes a definable pattern." There is a large concentration of aight­ inga along the ~stern Seaboard. another large concentration throU(;h­ out the 1t'ostern Coast states, and a . few sightiru?s- '-n the Mi ddle ,1est. Distribution of incidonts by configuration of object snd description of maneuverability is approximately equal in each of theoo araaa and this i o believed to further 'substanti ate the possibility tbet one type of object mieht have been observed in different asneots of fl i €ht . If sightings are induced by rumor, it seeca unusU£>1 t.lult more incidenta have not been reported from tho vreas with hi€h concentra- t 1on of population. Reports from such areas would also hnve creater facility in channel1IJG it seeca unusU£>1 t.lult more incidenta have not been reported from tho vreas with hi€h concentra- t 1on of population. Reports from such areas would also hnve creater facility in channel1IJG either to newspapers or official reporting ngon­ clee. For the most part , _o1ght1J1€;s have b~en made 1n fairly onen country where there are few ro,trictione to vhibilit7, .·~-hich may indicate that . obstructod vision hn.o reduced oightingo in bu11,-up aroas. It thorofore Geems th.at aome type of flying objoct has been ob­ served; tho identification of ita origin requires tho co~!pletion of other 3. Eoaa1blo Or1«1~ of UnuoU4l J'lrlns Objnpt1& Provided, upon the completion of annlyaeB, it 1c inrlicated that nome or nll of the reported flyill8 objects over the U.S. nro of foreign or1&in, the objectc could from a logical viewpoint, be couaidered Soviet. It is evident from the perforaance character1et1oe attributed to the un1dnntified objectn at thiu time that 1f they are foreign, the1 involve efficiencies of por­ formanoe which hnve not been ro&liz•d in nn~ op~rat1ollt\l airborne de­ vice in thie country. It at thiu time that 1f they are foreign, the1 involve efficiencies of por­ formanoe which hnve not been ro&liz•d in nn~ op~rat1ollt\l airborne de­ vice in thie country. It would, therefo•e, be o. rnietake to analyae the technical n,weets of the situation within th• limtt, of our cwn knowl­ edge of p~actinnl dcvelopmentn. It is more deeirable to consider then the 0\1ter llmiti, of poealble Soviet develop11entfl and objecti1.ve11 in nt• tEJmptlng to !c,rmul&.te aom idea of the tectic" whioh might be involved. of all, the objectiveG of ihe u.s.s.R. ha.ve - been st tod many times and indicatod i n many f orms, The most clear­ cut statement of this obJoctive is prob bl7 the one contained in the prea ble to the ourth five- year Plan (1946-1950) which states that the objective of Soviet science ie to overt ke and surp an the seienti- .fio and technical development ,of the ca 1tali t nat1ona~ It appar ntly .would be · n imnosoible tosk for the Goviet Union to ocoopliah such an .objoctive by proce ding st~- by- atep lone; the same lines tali t nat1ona~ It appar ntly .would be · n imnosoible tosk for the Goviet Union to ocoopliah such an .objoctive by proce ding st~- by- atep lone; the same lines of develop­ ment already achieved in the capitalist tione. This would menn that it would b-e ne oossary to rapidly proceed through en.ch phase of aero- n utic I development that bae lr aa,- been accomplished in thia country, and this ~robably would never have any pro pecto of ace ler ti Soviet dev lop­ ment b yond any point re ched by the U. S. Th obviou an wer to coom­ p lioh their objoct1v of not onl7 overt kin , but surpassing the capitalist oountrioa would b a sci nt1f1c shortcut . Thi poe 1b1lity 1 not so r - mote when examined on the b aio of our knowl dge of th curr nt ituation in th U. S. S. R. Provi~ d Soviot eophasis was ·iven to the mot promieing and dvaneed idea ncquir d fro Ge ny in 1945 and th work aided by Germ n aoientiote, the po e1b111t7 of catchi ~ and pooaibly Ul'p ssin other n tion int ohnic 1 dev lop Ge ny in 1945 and th work aided by Germ n aoientiote, the po e1b111t7 of catchi ~ and pooaibly Ul'p ssin other n tion int ohnic 1 dev lopment, b comes mor re 11at1c. It be­ comes ev n oor re 11 tio if th Soviet hav shown t ndency to ooncen- tr te on cort in d8velopm nte whioh have still not reoe1v d llaltimum of priority in our own progr • It is know that the u~ .s.R. hae sine 1946 enli ted the I r- vie of Vr . nther oc, German who head d all develop nt of low Uo (flyin wi ) t aircraft in Ge Y'• Dr. ook: 111 bulteved to b th op ci ntie in cl re t !' I.AM whio re "1r 1• 1 oc h 7urth r, 1 e fr fly- t airer f 0 he vi t • • co ld rd 4 • . the Germans o.nd possibly - flyi ng wing ty-pa aircraft w se confi[;Uration would be sinilor to des~ cr1r tions of cortain r eported flyinc ovor the U. S. The eati­ mated q,eeds of such range of the lower limits of speed attributed to flyin,e Uration would be sinilor to des~ cr1r tions of cortain r eported flyinc ovor the U. S. The eati­ mated q,eeds of such range of the lower limits of speed attributed to flyin,e o jecta over the U. S. . that emphaois on surpas~ll'lo oroii;n developments haa led to unuoual pro- - It ia not 1I!Jposs1ble ~ gres& in fucloandpropulaio by the u.s.s.R. In connection with pos- a1ble advancemento in the fi ld of fuelo and propuloion. 1t: shou.ld be observed that tho Russian o oituation (regardless of eotimated oil reaorvor,) io quite differont from t~t in the U. s. i"or e~le, u. s. oil industry is preparod to urn out tremendous qunntit1ea of hi~hly fractionotod petroleum pro tq, while the u.~.s.R. cannot reasonebly approach ouch c~pab111tiee. Thie consideration dictates d1f!orent solu­ tions on fuel~ for propuls1o 1n the two countrieo and 1n turn, dictnte1 - the direction taken in dev~~ omont of jat motors or the U88 of other pro- puloiv& dovicoa. We must tl rcfora. arrive .at the concluoion that any- Soviet aevice which mar have made ite s~ dev~~ omont of jat motors or the U88 of other pro- puloiv& dovicoa. We must tl rcfora. arrive .at the concluoion that any- Soviet aevice which mar have made ite s~penranoe over the u.s. as des- cribed, would possaeo unusUR performance charaot~ristioa ~hioli, in all probability, would include renge. The poo1ibilit7 th~t they could ' unconventional aircraft moy ~ve been flown ov~r tho U.S. tor ono, all, or a oombinntion of the followi g reasons: ha•• b~eu used in• propB&&nda eonao. it would be r easonable to assum thnt the Goviete would mooee ttret to fri«hten pro-Aoler:l.oan no.tton in .filu.rope with the ap_p•aranoe of a rnd.1.ooll;y 5 . , nev we~pon to counteract abilit~ of the U. S. t o obtain full propaganda effectivenees with the atom It will be remeI!l'berad t hat strange objects first appeared over he Scandinavian coUhtriee in 1946. The ob- jects observed there had unu ual range and unusual performance oharacteris- tics. As this demonstration over tho Scandinavian countries occurred tho U. S. was making a v1goro s campaign for t he economic and political aligru:ient of these nations th other pro~merican unusual performance oharacteris- tics. As this demonstration over tho Scandinavian countries occurred tho U. S. was making a v1goro s campaign for t he economic and political aligru:ient of these nations th other pro~merican ieatern ~uropean na­ tions. \?hen subsidod, strange flyine; objPcts bocan to be observod at an increaoine rote over the u. s. The conclusion on this point is that flyill(; object may h~ve been used to frighten both Euro- pean nations and the u.s. b~ tho appearance of a new device, and thnt foilure to i dent ify such a object would give them inval uable in­ dication that U . S. dovelopm i s far behind that of tho Soviets. Except for thi1J to promoto fear i e believed that the uce of tho objects hleaa 1n that the U. S. public has tended to characterize the&e incid tn entirely_ an ho.llucinationE1 by ''crack pote11 , misldentific~t1on of convent onal objecta, or that they repres~nt a secret American project ault from Soviet not be publici~ed. Any fear that micht re­ e only b~ a discovery that the objects h4ve been Soviet aircraft and t they involve radical developmanta which ore 1n advance of our objeot~ for the cellecticn Any fear that micht re­ e only b~ a discovery that the objects h4ve been Soviet aircraft and t they involve radical developmanta which ore 1n advance of our objeot~ for the cellecticn ~hotograph1o intGlligence or the mappil'IB of certain aren1 in the U.S The evaaive action emplo7ed by all objocta •16hted an attempt to avoid bei!l€ aightod. na an ~ttcmpt to prevent d11clo1u of the ex&ct t;vpe of fl1ing crmtt and it• miaeion. !rhe ~l~ht1nc of o eets over the U.S. ru o ~een most intense 1A Eaetorn and Westorn Coa~t • ln addition, Jightitl&• of flying ooJeote 6 J have been made near Oak Ridge, Tenn.; :Uo.s Cruces. n, H. , and in the ·- general area of the Hanford Works in ' Orogon_. Gonernlly, aightinis have not been made over what we consider strategic industrial arooe . The reason for thia mi~ht be either thnt the flying_objecto have boen ob­ served only enroute to or from misoiono over tbeGe . oore concentrated strategic arena, or that the Soviets obtained sufficient information during thoir World War II liaioon with u.s. industry to natiafy tho1r served only enroute to or from misoiono over tbeGe . oore concentrated strategic arena, or that the Soviets obtained sufficient information during thoir World War II liaioon with u.s. industry to natiafy tho1r . intelligence reQuirements and have a more active requir~~ent for in~oroa- tion on industrioe and area~ which were not available to the~ during World Uar It contacts. This 12 of inter~st in connection with the sightinca near Oak Ridge, LaG Cruces, and in tha general area of the Hanford Works nince theee eetabliohmnnts wrenot , end ara not , acocsaibl~ to Soviet collectoro of photo~raphic intelli -~onco. lt is poffolblo thnt the use of 5oviot f1Yill6 objects over the U. S. io int~ndcd oni,- to dotormine the ability of the U.3. defenses to npot ioreign aircraft . Thie would be of extreme laportanoe to the U.G.S.R. in tho event that a one-way all-out attack of Soviet atre.te­ g1o bombers 1o plcnned. Ability to operQto oYer the U.S. unin'W.bitod at a time when the u.s. is suppoced.17 ro-a1'1i21ng and puttin« greBt atrea1 on defenaee would provide yaluable informatiott on which to the U.S. unin'W.bitod at a time when the u.s. is suppoced.17 ro-a1'1i21ng and puttin« greBt atrea1 on defenaee would provide yaluable informatiott on which to base e1tlmate1 for probnbilit7 of suocftoe in bombing stratoeic obJectiTe1 1n the U. S. d. Ew;l1l111rbetiop Zl,ittht1....2If'I£ U.8. T0n:1to;a. This poaolbl~ reacon le ptrbnp$ the mott improbable. lt ie aooumod thnt, ohould thie 1;1urpooo bo involved, other purposori are prob bl1 nl~o ccoolllpllahed ln ite execution. Frov1dcd the u.n.s.n. het - unUoutilly hlsh pl!rformnnee a1rcreft they ~1{:ht find it ~dv.ontaeeoue to famllit1rhe the11eo).Toe '11th the tol)o,;ro.pbf of the C'.8. in anticipation ot futuro combat mi~aione to ~tratee1o tarcote • .., • I • 5. Concluaioa. !he conclusion thot some tYPe of flying object has been observed ovor the U.S. seems to be substantiated. It is not known at this time whether these obae:r"V'at1ono are mioidontifieations of do~estically launched devices, natural phenomenn, or foreien un­ conventional the U.S. seems to be substantiated. It is not known at this time whether these obae:r"V'at1ono are mioidontifieations of do~estically launched devices, natural phenomenn, or foreien un­ conventional aircraft. It is, therefore, i mpossible to noke any re­ liable oxplanation for their ar,pearanco over the U~S• or the tact1cB which they may- employ 1f the objects oboerved includo any foreign developmente in aeronautical fields. It is likewise i.Jp.possible at this time to contain diecuesiona of posoi~le perfornance charaotoristice or tactics within limits of practical reason, if for no other reason than the faot that proof of the existence of a foreign development of ,.. i. this tn>e would neoesearily introduce considerations of new principals D.nd means not ¥et conoidercd practical poeaibilitiee in our own re- eeorch and devol0pment . 8 • ; i t1 fJ) M rJ Sc en 0 ""J ~ I H •~ r., a 0 ~ 1111 ij r.o ..........._.... Co"l~i~:1ti<m •·nct,-;te ·ni.n~q.. All llGVN • r iol's ''Oll ·h •~::ur sh19e - ♦ '1.111 o" Fir., 41 nO"'· n: '•'it'" 1J APPENDIX II011 SEIEC.CED REPORTS ( All llGVN • r iol's ''Oll ·h •~::ur sh19e - ♦ '1.111 o" Fir., 41 nO"'· n: '•'it'" 1J APPENDIX II011 SEIEC.CED REPORTS (I!' FLYnrn OBJECT INCIDENTS A nunber ot reports on unidentified fly;l.ng objects come trom observer• fflio, beonuas o! their teobnioal background and experience do not appear to be infiuenoed by unfounded senaationallam nor ino,linod to report explahable phena1uma as new types 0£ airborne devices. Some of . the detailB of their report